INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS UNDER
THE 2004 MODEL U.S. BIT: A CHALLENGE
FOR STATE POLICE POWERS?
LAURA HENRY*
ABSTRACT
Countering current practice in investment treaty arbitration,
the 2004 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (“BIT”) authorizes
investors to raise a claim in investment treaty arbitration using
direct recourse arbitration for a breach of a category of contracts
called “investment agreements,” corresponding to natural resource
and public service concessions and infrastructure projects. I
analyze the consent clause for investment agreement claim
arbitration in the context of the evolution of dispute resolution of
transnational contracts between States and investors with
particular emphasis on the recent controversy in investment treaty
arbitration over contract claims, and discuss some of the
implications for States which commit to the investment agreement
provisions of the consent clause. A wide range of government
administrative actions affecting foreign investment, including nondiscriminatory regulations for public welfare purposes, could
become forms of compensable liability that are currently not
considered to be international wrongdoing under customary
international law or in contemporary BIT practice under the
investment agreement arbitration consent clause. Given the
theoretical problems with the judicial administration of contract
claims in treaty arbitration and the potential conflict with States’
rights to regulate, particularly in the field of environmental law, I
advocate a narrow construction of the investment agreement
provisions to reconcile them with customary international law and
investment arbitration practice.
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INTRODUCTION

The question of whether an investor may litigate breaches of
concession contracts through investment treaty arbitration has
generated heated controversy1 in treaty arbitration in recent years,
echoing a dispute between developed and developing countries
over the proper forum for the adjudication of concession
agreements for natural resource extraction that stretches back at
least a century.2 The United States has addressed this question
quite specifically in the dispute resolution clause of its latest

See generally Stanimir Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty:
The Jurisdiction of Treaty-based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract
Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v. Philippines, 5 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE
557 (2004) (discussing two contradicting holdings reached by the SGS tribunal in
deciding whether a tribunal set up by a investment treaty can exercise jurisdiction
on breaches of contract claims where there is an umbrella clause); Christopher
Schreuer, Investment Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims: the Vivendi I
Case Considered, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING
CASES FROM ICSID, NAFTA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 281, 281–324 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005); Emmanuel Gaillard,
Investment Arbitration and Jurisdiction over Contract Claims: the SGS Cases Considered
in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION: LEADING CASES FROM ICSID,
NAFTA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Supra, at 325, 325–46; Jared Wong, Umbrella Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties:
of Breaches of Contract, Treaty Violations, and the Divide Between Developing and
Developed Countries in Foreign Investment Disputes, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 135
(2006) (contending that a BIT tribunal has jurisdiction over breach-of-contract
claims since the umbrella clause applies to investor-states, and that such a tribunal
can exercise such jurisdiction notwithstanding an exclusive forum selection clause
designating a different forum); Michael D. Nolan & Edward G. Baldwin, The
Treatment of Contract-Related Claims in Treaty-based Arbitration, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB.
REP., June 2006, at 19 (noticing that many issues still arise as to how tribunals in
BIT-based arbitrations will handle private-law contract claims).
2 See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 20–24
(2d ed. 2004) (reviewing methods including bilateral treaties that developed in
international law to protect foreign investment by multinational corporations and
the problems associated with such protections); North American Dredging
Company of Texas (United States) v. Mexico (1926), 4 REP. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 26
(General Claims Commission 1926) (noting that the legal controversy as to
whether contracts with foreign investors may be adjudicated outside of national
court systems started in the Americas in the late 19th century with the Calvo
doctrine, entering into international relations between the developed countries
and the Middle East, Asia and Africa mainly after WWII: according to the Calvo
doctrine, in matters of host State interference with foreign property, the foreign
party must assert a claim in domestic courts under host State laws).
1
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prototype for its Bilateral Investment Treaties (“BITs”) and
Investment Chapters of Free Trade Agreements, the U.S. 2004
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (“the Model BIT”).3 Already
incorporated in nine investment treaty arrangements negotiated by
the U.S. beginning with the Singapore FTA4 in 2002, the dispute
resolution clause of the Model BIT (“DRC”),5 contains specific
procedures for the arbitration of certain transnational concession
contract claims, procedures that stand to challenge national
administrative law systems and impose de facto constraints on
signatory States’ prerogative to regulate for the health, safety and
welfare of their citizens.
Countering the current majority practice disfavoring the
arbitration of contract claims as such in investment treaty tribunals,
the DRC expressly authorizes qualified investors of the Treaty
Parties to raise a claim in investment treaty arbitration for a breach
of a category of contracts called “investment agreements,”
corresponding to agreements for natural resource and public
service concessions and public infrastructure projects. In this
Article I analyze the DRC expressing the advance consent of the
treaty parties to arbitrate investment agreement claims and discuss
some of their implications for States who would commit to the
provisions. In view of the theoretical difficulties with arbitrating
contract claims in treaty tribunals as well as the barriers these
provisions raise to environmental protection in particular, I argue
for a narrow interpretation of the provisions based on precedents
in investment treaty arbitration and customary international law.
According to the subject matter jurisdiction clause in Article 24
of the DRC, in the event an “investment dispute” cannot be
reconciled, a claimant may, “(a) on its own behalf or (b) on behalf
of an enterprise . . . that the claimant owns or controls directly or
indirectly,” submit a claim “(i) that the respondent has
Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of [Country] concerning the encouragement and reciprocal
protection
investment
[hereinafter
Model
BIT],
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf.
4 The counterparty countries are Oman, Singapore, Chile, Uruguay, Rwanda,
Colombia, Morocco, Panama, Korea and Peru. The provisions were also
incorporated in CAFTA. Dominican Republic—Central America—United States
Free Trade Agreement art. 20, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov
/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/cafta/asset_upload_file85_3940.pdf.
5 See Model BIT, supra note 3, Section B.
3
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breached . . . (C) an investment agreement; and (ii) that the
enterprise has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out
of, that breach . . . .”
As with many modern BITs, the Model BIT authorizes an
investor of one treaty party to make a claim directly against the
host State of investment in an international arbitration tribunal
through the advance expression of consent to such claims by the
host State (this is sometimes called direct recourse arbitration or
“arbitration without privity”).6 Such an award is not appealable by
national courts. It is subject at most to internal review by the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”),7 or it may be challenged at the enforcement stage for
limited causes. Recognized within the ambit of the United Nations
Convention for the Enforcement and Recognition for Foreign
Arbitral Awards (“the New York Convention”)8 the awards of an

6 See Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 232, 233 (1995) (“By allowing direct recourse by private
complainants with respect to such a wide range of issues, these [multilateral]
treaties create a dramatic extension of arbitral jurisdiction in the international
realm.”).
7 See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 52, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S.
159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. When the parties to the dispute choose the
ICSID rules for dispute settlement under the treaty, article 52 of the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States (“the ICSID Convention”) applies, limiting all forms of review to the ICSID
Annulment Procedure, which states that a decision may be annulled if an Ad Hoc
Committee finds:

(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted;
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded its powers;
(c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal;
(d) that there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; or
(e) that the award has failed to State the reasons on which it is based.
See Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 34.9 (“A disputing party may seek
enforcement of an arbitration award under the ICSID Convention or the New
York Convention [or the Inter-American Convention] regardless of whether
proceedings have been taken under paragraph 8.”); Convention on the
Enforcement and Recognition for Foreign Arbitral Awards art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating that a country may refuse to recognize an
award under limited circumstances).
8
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arbitration tribunal founded under the Model BIT must be
enforced by the mandate of the treaty.9 A party may also seek
enforcement in the national courts under the convention
establishing ICSID.10
While the Model BIT and the new treaties based on it are not
unique in authorizing the resolution of disputes arising out of
contracts in an international tribunal,11 they are apparently the first
to specifically require the settlement of a claim for a breach of a
concession contract with an investor under direct recourse
arbitration pursuant to a consent clause.
Since concession
agreements may provide for dispute resolution according to the
laws of the host State under its judicial processes, the treaty
provisions may allow investors ex post facto to circumvent the
domestic courts, as though the parties had originally agreed upon
international commercial arbitration for the settlement of disputes
related to the contract instead. When combined with the general
duties for recognition and enforcement of awards in the treaty, the
investment agreement claim provisions make the enforcement of
the specific obligations in the investment agreement through treaty
arbitration an international duty for which money damages is the
principal remedy.

See Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 34.7 (“Each Party shall provide for the
enforcement of an award in its territory.”); id. art 37 (discussing state-state dispute
settlement).
10 See Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 24.3 (“Provided that six months have
elapsed since the events giving rise to the claim, a claimant may submit a claim
referred to in paragraph 1 under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Rules of
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, provided that both the respondent and the
non-disputing Party are parties to the ICSID Convention.”).
11 See, e.g., Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular
Republic of Algeria, 1 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 3 (1981); Declaration of the
Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the
Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran art. 2, sec. 1, 1 Iran–U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep.
9 (1981). Collectively called the Algiers Accord, these conventions created the
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal and vested the tribunal with jurisdiction to
deal with disputes arising over contracts. However, the contracts to be resolved
under the treaty were those for which the parties were either both private entities
or both governments. Thus, when a State party was involved in a dispute with an
alien of another country concerning a contract, the claims alleged expropriation
under international law with contractual rights as the object of expropriation,
rather than breach of contract as such.
9
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As treaty tribunals have declined to make awards solely on the
basis of the breach of a State contract12 to this point,13 the
investment agreement claims provisions create an entirely new
remedy in investment treaty arbitration, one that has strong
potential to conflict with the normal regulatory and administrative
functions in the areas of public contracting, environmental
regulation and the disposition of natural resources of host States.
The prospective clash with host State administrative law originates
in the open-ended language of the consent clause including the
award clause,14 that could impose compensable liability on a much
wider range of State conduct than in either current investment
treaty claims or international law claims arising from the
discriminatory breach of contract with an alien. Under a broad
interpretation yet one that is not far from the plain meaning of the
text, unanticipated non-discriminatory regulation of the host State
for legitimate public purposes would require financial
compensation to the investor for any compliance costs incidentally
incurred to an investment under the concession contract, extending
potentially to foregone profits.15 Investors would not need to
demonstrate conduct that amounted to a violation of customary
international law or the treaty to obtain relief. In addition, if the
investment agreement contains a stabilization clause, host States
could face much tighter constraints in policy and be more
frequently obliged to compensate for regulation.16 Faced with such
12 I take State contract to mean a contract between a State and an alien
investor in the general sense.
13 But see Eureko B.V. v. Republic of Poland (Neth. v. Pol.), Partial Award and
Dissenting Opinion, para. 262, 12 ICSID (W. Bank) 335 (2005) (granting plaintiff
remedy on the grounds that Poland had breached its contractual duties under the
investment agreement). This is the only case I know of in which a breach of
contract was deemed an independent cause for compensation in an investment
treaty arbitration. The breach of a contract was deemed a breach of the treaty’s
umbrella clause and consequently was found to be a compensable breach of the
treaty. However, no decision on the measure of damages was rendered and
annulment has been applied for. See the Agreement on Encouragement and
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Neth.-Pol., Sept. 7, 1992, 2240 U.N.T.S. 387
for specific provisions of the treaty.
14 See infra Section 4.1.
15 Id.
16 See discussion infra Section 2.3; Lorenzo Cotula, Regulatory Takings,
Stabilization Clauses and Sustainable Development (March 27–28, 2008) (paper
submitted for the OECD Global Forum on International Investment VII), available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/8/40311122.pdf
(“Compared
to
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legal sanctions arising from these treaty commitments, developing
countries I argue will rationally opt to forego promulgating or
enforcing environmental and social legislation applying to
investment agreements to the detriment of environmental
governance and sustainable development.
The introduction of contract claim arbitration into treaty
tribunals raises many theoretical difficulties from the point of view
of judicial administration as well. These dilemmas stem from
direct jurisdictional conflicts with domestic tribunals as well as the
governing law provisions of the investment agreement claim that
allow international law to be applied to aspects of the contract
claim. Also, without any precedent in public international law for
contractual remedies as such, the provisions raise the specter of a
new hybrid-variety of contractual remedies grounded neither in
public international law nor in domestic contract law. Such
uncertainties could ultimately undermine the predictability and
stability that are the goals of the U.S. Model BIT.
Before discussing the text of the investment agreement
provisions of the DRC, I place the investment agreement
provisions in their legal and historical context with an overview of
the dispute resolution of transnational concession contracts. The
investment agreement provisions are a compromise proposal in a
historical debate on the internationalization of concession contracts
and a response to more recent objections to the arbitration of
concession contracts in investment tribunals. In Section 2, I sketch
briefly the well-documented twentieth century evolution of
various theories internationalization17 of concession contracts
advocated by capital-exporting countries and opposing doctrines
favored by capital-importing countries. Then, after reviewing
some general public international law principles regarding
contracts between States and alien investors and the legal
framework for investment treaty arbitration, in Section 3 I review
the holdings of recent influential BIT arbitrations on the treatment
of contract claims in treaty tribunals. Section 4 presents the key
provisions of the DRC relating to investment agreements. In this
Section I highlight how the investment agreement provisions of the
DRC leave unresolved several of the objections to treaty arbitration
regulatory takings doctrine and despite significant variation across contracts,
stabilization clauses tend to significantly lower the threshold beyond which host
states must pay compensation.”).
17 SORNARAJAH, supra note 2.
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of contract claims discussed in the investment treaty awards in
Section 3. Finally, in Section 5, I explore in more detail the scope
and implications of the conflict between the investment agreement
provisions and the exercise of police powers by host States. I
propose a narrower interpretation of the DRC in line with the
customary international law of state contracts and investment
treaty arbitration practice that is consistent with the international
law prerogative of states to regulate for the public welfare. Section
6 concludes.
2.

THEORIES ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF STATE
CONTRACTS

It is common for foreign investors who undertake a foreign
investment project to bargain for an agreement with the host
government granting rights or promising some measure of support
for the carrying-out of the project. Even though in some
investment situations, host State promises may only negligibly
influence a foreigner’s decision to invest, more acute situations
arise in long-term, capital intensive projects where public services
are provided or natural resources extracted in close cooperation
with the host State. It is then impossible to discount the
significance of promises made in such contracts for an investor’s
decision to pledge resources. At the same time, a breach of an
agreement upon which such a long-term investment is based can
result in significant losses for sunken costs that may not be fully
recoverable against a host State in the host State’s court system.
There is also the problem of the obsolescing bargain:18 the
bargaining power of the investor is at its apex just before the
conclusion of the agreement while the host State is seeking to
induce capital, technology and know-how; afterwards the host
State has incentives to unilaterally revise its terms.
Nevertheless, when a host government entity enters into a
contract with an investor, the investor may be required to raise his
or her grievance in the tribunals of the host State if a conflict arises,
either because domestic law requires it or because the host State

Raymond Vernon, International Investment and International Trade in the
Product Cycle, 80 Q.J. ECON. 190 (1966) (using tools such as the timing of
innovation, the effects of scale economies, and the roles of ignorance and
uncertainty to analyze the shifts in international trade and international
investment).
18
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had superior bargaining power in the negotiations. From the
investor’s point of view, this means the investor may face
potentially biased host government institutions in the investment
process, which may at various stages depend critically on the
administrative decisions of the host State and/or be significantly
affected by legislative changes in the legal framework of the
investment. When an irreconcilable dispute over such a project
arises, should an investor be able to bring a claim for breach of
contract against a government in a public international forum such
as a treaty tribunal?
The problem of how to protect foreign investments within a
host country’s legal system has been an ongoing concern for capital
exporting countries since a series of nationalizations of petroleum
concessions in the Middle East in the middle of the last century.
Dissatisfied with the compensation from national tribunals for
those expropriations and simultaneously faced with the collapse of
the legal and political controls supporting traditional concession
agreements after the Second World War, capital-exporting
countries advanced various legal theories to afford concession
contracts external legal protection outside of the host State legal
system, that is, to “internationalize” them.19 Accordingly, since the
1950s legal practitioners and academics from the capital-exporting
countries have developed and propounded an alternative body of
transnational contract law to apply to concession agreements that
displaces or supplements national law, drawing inspiration, in
many cases, from previously failed attempts to bring contract
claims before the ICJ and other international tribunals. These
theories surfaced in the ad hoc arbitrations following the petroleum
nationalizations,20 in which arbitrators grappled with the
19 See A.F.M. Maniruzzuman, State Contracts in Contemporary International
Law: Monist versus Dualist Controversies, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 309, 309 (2001) (defining
internationalization as a theory that “suggests that, no matter what law the parties
to such a contract choose as the proper law of the contract, international law
superimposes their choice and applies automatically as the overriding governing
law”).
20 See Sapphire Int. Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co. (Sapphire), 35
I.L.R. 136 (Arb. Trib. 1963) (documenting a case that occurred in the 1960s as a
result of the second oil nationalization in Iran). See also British Petroleum
Exploration Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic (BP v. Libya), 53 I.L.R. 297 (Arb. Trib.
1973); Texaco Overseas Petroleum Corp. v. Libyan Arab Republic (TOPCO), 53
I.L.R. 389 (Arb. Trib. 1977); Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic
(LIAMCO), 20 I.L.M. 1 (Arb. Trib. 1981) (documenting the cases that the Libyan
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interpretation and legal nature of a generation of petroleum
concession agreements.
Internationalization was seen as all the more urgent by capital
exporting companies as a developing country consensus had
coalesced in the UN to recognize sovereign rights over the
disposition of natural resources and a sovereign right to
autonomous economic development. Over time, this competing
norm of permanent sovereign rights over natural resources21 was
assimilated into the investment laws and constitutions of several
developing countries. The strengthening of host State autonomy
and supervision over concession contracts led capital exporting
States to turn increasingly to investment treaties to secure
protection for concession contracts, a trend which accelerated in
the 1990s amid the fervor worldwide for liberalization of
investment and trade and transparency in governance.22
2.1. Choice of Law Clauses and Forum Selection Clauses
Many advocates of the concept of internationalization have
contended that by designating international law in the place of the
domestic contract law as the governing law of the concession
contract, and by choosing international arbitration in the forum
selection clause, the host State will be bound under international
law to the individual obligations in the agreement.23 The most
oil industry nationalization in 1970 gave rise to); Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co.
(AMINOIL), 21 I.L.M. 976 (Arb. Trib. 1982) (describing the ad hoc proceedings on
compensation for nationalization that occurred in response to Kuwait’s
termination of a 1948 oil concession in favor of an American company); Saudi
Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R. 117 (Arb. Trib. 1963)
(involving another arbitration concerning breach of a concession agreement).
21 See G.A. Res. 626 (VII), U.N. Doc. A/2361 (Dec. 21, 1952), available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/7/ares7.htm (detailing the “right to
exploit freely natural wealth and resources”); G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), U.N. Doc.
A/5217 (Dec. 14, 1962), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/17
/ares17.htm (describing states’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources).
22 See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. [UNCTAD], State Contracts, at 6, U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2004/11, U.N. Sales No. E.05.II.D.5 (2005) (“State
contracts and the conflict of doctrines associated with them may be seen as a core
purpose of making investment treaties.”).
23 See Robert Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L. 156, 156 (1961) (examining “[h]ow far a sovereign State which enters into a
contract with an alien becomes subject thereby to obligations of public
international law”).
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common version of this theory assumes the existence of a kind of
universal private international law of contract outside of either
municipal law or public international law based on international
commercial practice, a modern lex mercatoria, that applies to
transnational concession contracts between alien investors and
States. Proponents of this transnational law of State contracts have
stressed the binding effects of selected general principles of law as
referred to in Art. 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. In particular, they
have relied heavily on pacta sunt servanda,24 as well as the
requirement to observe good faith25 in contractual relationships
and the doctrine of acquired rights.26 Although the concept of a
universal private law based on international commercial practices
has found almost universal acceptance in international sales and
finance contracting between private parties and, to a lesser extent,
in procurement contexts, the same has not been true for concession
contracts.
Under concession contracts, the host State has
traditionally enjoyed the rights of unilateral termination and
modification and has encountered a standard of compensation for
breach less than that for commercial contracts as a form of
administrative contract.27
An alternative justification for the belief that choice of law and
arbitration clauses could achieve internationalization is a theory
characterizing modern concession contracts as public international
law agreements. 28 A minority of scholars argues that, by virtue of

24 See Sapphire, 35 I.L.R at 181 (involving the principle that every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good
faith; thereby implying that a party cannot invoke provisions of its municipal law
as justification for a failure to perform).
25 See Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., 23 I.L.M. 351 (1983).
See
generally Int’l Inst. for the Unification of Private Law [UNIDROIT], , art. 1.7 (1994),
available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/main.htm
(codifying the good faith principle).
26 See Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Co., 27 I.L.R. 117, 117 (Arb. Trib.
1958).
27 See Abul F.M. Maniruzzaman, The Lex Mercatoria and International
Contracts: A Challenge for International Commercial Arbitration?, 14 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 657 (1999) (discussing the principle of lex mercatoria which refers to rules
devised by the business community to regulate commercial activities, including
the general principle of laws as well as codified principles, such as the UNIDROIT
principles).
28 See Prosper Weil, Problemes Relatifs aux Contrats Passés entre un Etat et un
Particulier [Problems Concerning Contracts Between States and Private Parties], 128
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the unique character of agreements for the extraction of natural
resources under EDAs or “economic development agreements” or
“investment agreements,”29 a breach of such an agreement would
invoke State responsibility per se. In the TOPCO arbitration, the
sole arbitrator Dupuy followed this theory30 to conclude that a
breach of an oil concession contract was internationally wrongful,31
even though the governing law clause of the concession agreement
at issue gave priority to domestic law. This theory met the
frequent objection that it would confer treaty status onto
concession agreements and elevate the investor party to the
contract to the status of a sovereign in international law.
2.2 Umbrella Clauses
As an alternative to contractual devices, capital-exporting
countries sought to protect concession contracts through bilateral
treaties. The original vehicle for this was the “umbrella” or
“obligations clause” which became a consistent feature of the new
“investment protection treaties” introduced by Germany after
WWII and later adapted by the UK and the U.S.32 to replace its

RECUEIL DES COURS 95 (1969) (claiming that treaties may elevate contractual
undertakings into international law obligations by stipulating that breach by one
State of a contract with a private party from the other State will also constitute a
breach of the treaty between the two States).
29 See
Stephem M. Schwebel, International Protection of Contractual
Arrangements, PROC. AM. SOC. INT’L L. 226, 269 (1959); Oyunchimeg Bordukh,
Choice of Law in State Contracts in Economic Development Sector—Is There
Party Autonomy? (2008) (unpublished S.J.D. thesis, Bond University) (on file with
Bond University) (stating that EDAs “are not just a mere type of state contract
made between a state or a state entity and a foreign national or a legal person of
foreign nationality, rather [they] must satisfy certain criteria to be accepted as [a]
foreign investment contract enforceable under international law”).
30 See Texaco Overseas Petroleum Corp. v. Libya, Merits, 17 I.L.M. 1, para. 45
(1977) (holding that the Libyan government breached an “internationalized”
foreign investment contract).
31 See also Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22)
(involving a case wherein the British Government asserted this theory, but the
Court declined jurisdiction); Memorial, 1952 I.C.J. 64, 74 (Feb. 4), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/16/8981.pdf
(discussing
the
double
character of the Concession Convention of 1933).
32 See Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Investments, U.S.–
Pan., Oct. 27, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1227; Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.–Arm., Sept. 23, 1992, 1996 S.
Treaty Doc. No. 103–11 (1993) (including umbrella clauses that were used in
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Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. Reproduced in
various forms, umbrella clauses proliferated to such a degree that
UNCITRAL has estimated that over forty percent of the more than
2500 BITs in existence contain umbrella clauses.33 The first
umbrella clause appeared in the 1957 Abs-Shawcross Draft
Convention on Foreign Investment, 34 an early attempt to create a
permanent international investment protection tribunal through a
multilateral investment treaty. That clause, Article II, reads: “Each
Party shall at all times ensure the observance of any undertakings
which it may have given in relation to investments made by
nationals of any other party.”35
The idea for umbrella clauses derived from a 1954 draft
settlement agreement for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s claims
regarding Iran’s oil nationalization program. 36 The settlement had
created an “umbrella treaty” between Iran and the UK
incorporating the private agreement between Iran and AIOC, such
that a breach of the private agreement automatically became a
breach of the treaty.
Accordingly, under an expansive
contemporary interpretation of umbrella clauses in treaty
arbitration, an umbrella clause in an investment treaty elevates a
contract breach by a State to an international wrongdoing,
regardless of the nature of the contract or the specific provision
breached, and as a consequence, vests the treaty tribunal with
subject matter jurisdiction for the contract claim.37 One investment
negotiating treaties until NAFTA dropped the clause in 1994, along with any
reference to contract claims).
33 See Katia Yannaca-Small, Interpretation of the Umbrella Clause in Investment
Agreements, (OECD Working Paper No. 3, 2006) (discussing examples of umbrella
clauses, as well as the interpretation of umbrella clauses in investment
agreements).
34 See Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs/Shawcross), Apr. 1959,
reprinted in 5 INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM, 301 U.N.
Doc. UNCTAD DITE/2 (2000).
35 Id. art. 2.
36 See Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the
International Law of Investment Protection, 20 ARB. INT’L 411, 413–18 (2004)
(describing the history and function of the umbrella clause). See also Wong, supra
note 1, at 137 (discussing the debates over the proper construction of the umbrella
clause).
37 See Thomas W. Wälde, The Umbrella (or Sanctity of Contract/Pacta sunt
Servanda) Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment on Original Intentions and
Oct. 2004,
available
at
Recent
Cases,
TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT.,
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tv1-4
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treaty tribunal went farther to state: “An umbrella clause is usually
seen as transforming municipal law obligations into obligations
directly cognizable in international law.”38
Those who argue that umbrella clauses in investment treaties
operate to attach State responsibility to a State contract breach39
and those who argue internationalization could be achieved
through a choice of law clause, tend to defend their positions on
similar grounds. They contend it was equitable to preserve a
remedy when the host State retroactively uses its legislative or
administrative powers to avoid or modify its obligations under a
contract or otherwise interferes with the investor’s property rights
in a manner that nevertheless accords with domestic law.40 Even if
a State’s conduct does not rise to outright expropriation, it was
desirable and equitable to protect the investor’s legitimateinvestment-backed expectations.41 Although less relevant today to
-article_2.htm (commenting on the original intentions behind the umbrella
clause).
38 Noble Ventures v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, para. 53 (Oct. 12,
2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.
39 F. A. Mann, British Treaties for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 52
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 241, 246 (1981):
[I]t protects the investor against any interference with his contractual
rights, whether it results from a mere breach of contract or a legislative
or administrative act, and independently of whether or not such
interference amounts to expropriation. The variation of the terms of a
contract or license by legislative measures, the termination of the
contract or the failure to perform any of its terms, for instance, by nonpayment, the dissolution of the local company with which the investor
may have contracted and the transfer of its assets (with or without the
liabilities)—these and similar acts the treaties render wrongful.
40 This was a central concern in the Sapphire arbitration.
Sapphire Int.
Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 35 I.L.R. 136 (Int’l Arb. Trib. 1963). These
arguments had previously been used to justify the positions of the Swiss and
French governments in the Losinger Case and the Norwegian Loan cases
respectively. Losinger Case (Switz. v. Yugo.), 1936 P.C.I.J. (ser. C) No. 78 (June
27); Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6). In many if not most
contemporary legal systems, public contracts contain a termination at will clause
in favor of the government party. See Derek W. Bowett, State Contracts with
Aliens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach, 59
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 49, 56–58 (1988) in which he discusses “termination at
convenience clauses” in the United States and the U.K.
41 Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., Final Award, 21 I.L.M. 976 (Int’l Arb. Trib.
1982). The norm of preserving legitimate-investment-backed expectations for
concession projects has since independently become most progressively
developed under the prohibition of uncompensated indirect expropriation and
the fair and equitable treatment minimum treatment standard in BIT
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post-independence developing countries, it was also argued that
making specific contractual obligations binding through
international law was necessary in areas of potential political
turmoil with weak or incomplete systems of law.
2.3. Stabilization Clauses in Investment Agreements
A third theory by which State contracts could be
internationalized was the use of a stabilization clause in the
concession agreement.
In most newly independent capitalimporting countries, concession agreements in the oil sector
underwent significant transformations in form after independence
through renegotiation after nationalization, or by agreement in line
with profound changes in the conditions in industry. Consistent
with the new legal relations between capital exporting countries
and their former colonies, these changes reflected the fundamental
shift in power in the developing countries over mineral rights.
Traditionally no more than licenses to conduct economic activities
within a territory in return for the remission of royalties, the new
oil concession agreements emerged as complex structures with the
investor agreeing to provide technical assistance and training and
major infrastructural inputs on a long-term basis in cooperation
with the host State. Most commonly taking the form of productsharing agreements in the oil industry,42 the new natural resource
concession was generally highly regulated domestically and
supervised by the host State through a State company. A typical
product sharing agreement in the oil industry allocates the risk to
the investor for the exploration and discovery of the mineral. If
successful, the host country and investor share ownership over the
extracted mineral until the investor’s cost of exploration is fully
recovered.43
jurisprudence.
Dolzer and Schreuer assert that the investor’s legitimate
expectations are based on the host State’s legal framework for investment at the
time of investment plus any explicit assurances on which the investor relied.
RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPHER SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 134 (2008).
42 For examples of the many forms that contemporary petroleum concession
agreements can take, see the website of the Independent Petroleum Association of
America, http://www.ipaa.org. See also R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN
INVESTMENT DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 213–316 (2005).
43 Although I emphasize petroleum concessions here as they historically have
been an influential source of arbitral cases on concession agreements, accelerated
investment in public service concessions such as water purification,
telecommunications and electricity generation under BOT and BOO schemes took
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The stabilization clause, an older contractual device countering
State interference in concession agreements, was correspondingly
revised for the new legal realities. Termed by some commentators
as a special variant of choice-of-law clause,44 stabilization clauses
are employed by investors to prevent governments from changing
the terms of a concession agreement by imposing various
compensation conditions to any changes in the contract.
Stabilization clauses in pre-war concessions45 simply attempted to
prevent nationalization by forbidding the termination of the
concession by administrative or legislative decree.
Once
nationalization of natural resource industries was generally
recognized as legal if undertaken for legitimate public purposes
and subject to adequate compensation,46 investors began to
incorporate stabilization clauses in investment agreements to
allocate the financial risk of less drastic legislative changes
lowering the value of the long-term investment. In so doing,
stabilization clauses began to encompass a progressively broader
range of government conduct. Contemporary stabilization clauses
often seek to lock-in negotiated tax benefits and the off-take price
in a public service or natural resource concession by forbidding
changes in host country legislation that alter the conditions of the
investment without the consent of the investor.47 They may range
in scope from a “freezing clause,” requiring the applicable law to
be the domestic law at the time of the conclusion of the contract to
the exclusion of all subsequent regulation, to an economic
place in the late 20th century, especially with the increase in privatization projects
in the post-Soviet States. DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 41, at 73.
44 Id. at 75.
45 See, for example, Article 17 of the 1948 Concession Agreement between
Aminoil and the Shaikh of Kuwait as relayed in Martin Hunter & Anthony
Sinclair, Aminoil Revisited: Reflections on a Story of Changing Circumstances, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION LEADING CASES FROM ICSID,
NAFTA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 1, at 347.
46 The arbitrator in the TOPCO arbitration found nationalization to be a
violation of the concession’s stabilization clause. Texaco v. Libya (TOPCO),
Merits, 17 I.L.M. 1, 25–31 (Int’l Arb. Trib. 1978). The arbitrators in BP Libya,
Liamco-Libya, and Aminoil did not find that stabilization clauses could not render
nationalization illegal. See Rosalyn Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State:
Recent Developments in International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259, 301–04 (1982).
47 Thomas W. Waelde & George N’di, Stabilising International Investment
Commitments: International Law Versus Contract Interpretation, 1 CENTRE FOR ENERGY
PETROLEUM & MINERAL L. & POL’Y 9 (2000), available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk
/cepmlp/journal/html/Vol1/article1-9.html.
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equilibrium clause, which requires compensation in case of a
change in expected profits from a project.48
Today, such stabilization clauses potentially conflict directly
with public contracting laws in many countries as well as national
constitutions.
According to one view, however, even if
stabilization clauses are invalid under domestic law, within
investment agreements they are capable of binding the State under
international law to specific investment obligations,49 particularly if
a relevant investment treaty contains an umbrella clause, or the
choice of law clause in an arbitration clause for the investment
agreement specifies international law and the forum selection
clause calls for international arbitration. Some argue that the
breach of a stabilization clause becomes an international
wrongdoing as a breach of a sovereign commitment to refrain from
exercising sovereign powers.50
Throughout the twentieth century, the international settlement
of concession disputes under dispute resolution clauses was
formalized through an expansion of institutions and a growing
acceptance of the theory of party autonomy in judicial systems
requiring judicial acquiescence in forum selection clauses.
International commercial arbitration continued to gain credibility
and currency with the widespread ratification of the New York
48 For a discussion of the implications of stabilization clauses for the exercise
of social and environmental regulation, see Cotula, supra note 16.
49 This was argued by the British government in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v.
Iran), 1952 I.C.J. Pleadings 64, 86–93 (July 22). Sornarajah summarizes this theory
as, “[t]he inclusion of the stabilization clause was seen as evidencing the intention
of the State party not to subject it to its domestic law but to subject it to some
external system which would ensure the validity of the stabilization clause and
the contract which contains it.” SORNARAJAH, supra note 2, at 408. The current
approach to the validity of stabilization clauses is to balance the limitations on
sovereignty imposed by the clause with the reasonable expectations of the parties
in light of all the relevant circumstances. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 554 (5th ed. 1998).
50 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (ARAMCO), 27 I.L.R 117 (Int’l Arb.
Trib. 1963); Sapphire Int. Petroleums Ltd. v. Nat’l Iranian Oil Co., 53 I.L.R. 163
(1963); TOPCO, 17 I.L.M. at 17. See El Paso Energy International Company v.
Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15 (Apr. 27, 2006);
Pan Am. Energy LLC & B.P. Argentina Exploration Co. v. Argentina, Preliminary
Objections (PAE), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13 (July 27, 2006), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-eng.pdf
(highlighting the separation of general international law and treaty law). For an
overview of the holdings of major ad hoc petroleum arbitrations concerning
stabilization clauses, see Margarita Coale, Stabilization Clauses in International
Petroleum Transactions, 30 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 217, 223–26 (2002).
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Convention, making it much easier to enforce foreign and
commercial arbitral awards than foreign judgments.51
The
establishment of ICSID in 1965 was a watershed event that
permitted parties in a dispute over a concession agreement to
request ICSID arbitration by presenting an agreement to arbitrate
at ICSID in writing. The law relating to transnational State contract
dispute resolution was developed through ad hoc petroleum
arbitrations, the arbitrations of private tribunals of the ICC, public
mixed claims tribunals,52 and in ICSID tribunals.53
In the United States, the implementing legislation of the New York
Convention under the Federal Arbitration Act is 9 U.S.C. §§ 3–4 (2006) (stating
that proceedings shall be stayed when an issue therein has been referred to
arbitration), 9 U.S.C. § 206 (stating that a court may force arbitration to be held),
and 9 U.S.C. § 208 (stating that this chapter should not be applied in such a
manner as to conflict with the Convention).
52 Concerning oil concessions in the Iran-U.S. Claims tribunals, see Amoco
Int’l Finance v. Iran, 15 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 189 (1987) (holding that the
shareholding interest in Kharg Chemical Company was lawfully expropriated by
the Government of Iran and that the Government of Iran shall pay Amoco
compensation for the expropriation); Mobil Oil Inc. v. Iran, 16 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib.
Rep. 3 (1987) (holding that Iran is liable to Mobil for losses which Mobil could
have expected to recover pursuant to successful negotiation of an agreement
settling all the issues relating to the termination of the Sale and Purchase
Agreement); Sedco Inc. v. National Iranian Oil Co., 9 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 248
(1985) (holding that Sedco’s shareholder interest in Sediran Drilling Company
was expropriated by Iran); Phillips Petroleum Inc. v. Iran (Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib 1989),
reprinted in International Decisions, 85 AM. J. INT’L. L. 184 (1991) (holding the
Government of Iran liable for compensation for property taken during the Iranian
Revolution). The early history of state contracts in mixed claim tribunals in the
Americas is documented in Chittharanjan F. Amerasinghe, State Breaches of
Contracts with Aliens and International Law, 58 AM. J. INT’L. L. 881 (1964) (detailing
when the breach by a state of a contract between an alien and the state constitutes
a breach of international law).
53 See Klockner v. Cameroon, Award, 2 ICSID (W. Bank) 9 (1994) (rejecting
the requests that Cameroon make payment of the outstanding balance of a
fertilizer factory and that Cameroon be compensated for losses it had incurred in
the abandoned fertilizer project); S. Pac. Props. Ltd. v. Egypt, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3, reprinted in 3 ICSID (W. Bank) 131 (1992)
(granting jurisdiction to the Centre as there was no agreed upon dispute
resolution mechanism); Amco Asia Corp. v. Indonesia, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/1, reprinted in 1 ICSID (W. Bank) 377 (1988) (holding that the tribunal had
jurisdiction over the parties); Vacuum Salt Prod. Ltd. v. Ghana, ICSID Case No.
ARB/92/1, reprinted in 4 ICSID (W. Bank) 320 (1998) (dismissing the request for
arbitration due to a lack of jurisdiction); Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Liberia,
ICSID Case No. ARB/83/2, Award of March 31, 1986 and Rectification of June 17,
51
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Beginning in the 1990s, investment treaties with consent
clauses came to play a more prominent role. Following a sharp
rise in the number of BITs with arbitration consent clauses,
investors attempted to use direct recourse arbitration to
unilaterally seize investment treaty tribunals for concession
contract claims by invoking the umbrella clause and other general
language in the subject matter jurisdiction clauses of investment
protection treaties. Usually they did so notwithstanding a forum
selection clause in the contract calling for resolution in the courts of
the host State. Thus, a body of BIT arbitration cases addressing
claims arising from concession contract disputes54 joined the
earlier decisions relied on by arbitral tribunals to analyze
transnational State contract issues. But rather than deciding the
disputes as transnational contract claims, as would occur in
international commercial arbitration, investment treaty tribunals
have instead almost uniformly accepted jurisdiction because of a
breach in a relevant substantive treaty obligation between States.
In particular, they have awarded relief to investors in concession
contract disputes based on more diverse and subtle interpretations
of the violations of the prohibition against uncompensated
expropriation and the duty of fair and equitable treatment.55
1986, 26 I.L.M. 647 (1987) (holding Liberia breached the contract and must pay
damages).
54 See Catriona Paterson, Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in Infrastructure
Projects (OECD, Working Papers on International Investment No. 2006/2, 2006)
(studying twenty-eight arbitrations under BITs in telecommunications,
transportation, water and sanitation and the energy sector).
55 See Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/6
(Dec. 22, 2003); PSEG Global, Inc., v. Turkey, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5
(Jan. 19, 2007) (holding that Turkey breached its Treaty obligation to accord the
investor fair treatment and must pay damages); Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia
(Aguas), Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3 (Oct. 21, 2005)
(holding that there is not sufficient evidence to support an allegation of abuse of
corporate form or fraud); Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador (Duke
Energy), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19 (Aug. 18, 2008) (holding that
Ecuador breached the Treaty and must pay damages); Azurix Corp. v. Argentina
(Azurix), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (July 14, 2006) (holding that Azurix
has shown that it has a prima facie case against Argentina for breaching the
Treaty); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina (CMS Award), Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 12, 2005) (holding that Argentina breached the
obligation in the Treaty to accord the investor fair and equitable treatment and
must pay damages); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (CME), Award,
UNCITRAL (Mar. 14, 2003) (holding that the Czech Republic breached the Treaty
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After discussing the general principles of international law
related to contract claims and investment treaty arbitration, below I
present the reasoning of some of these BIT arbitrations on the
treatment of contract claims in treaty tribunals. The awards below
are predominantly concerned with the threshold question of
whether the investment treaty tribunal has jurisdiction for contract
claims based on the scope of the consent to arbitrate in the relevant
treaty.
These cases are significant because they reflect the many
dilemmas faced by public international law tribunals when
considering contract claims, particularly the treatment of forum
selection clauses. More broadly, the rationales of these decisions
on umbrella clauses frequently go to the heart of objections to the
jurisdiction of treaty tribunals for contract claims.
3.

CONTRACT CLAIMS IN BIT TRIBUNALS

3.1. General Principles
3.1.1.

Breach of a Contract with an Alien Investor and State
Responsibility

Under the customary international law on the treatment of
aliens and their property, an ordinary breach of a contract with an
alien will not give rise to State responsibility in the absence of some
discriminatory or arbitrary conduct.56 Customary international
law concerning State contracts with aliens evolved in the legal
context of the system of diplomatic protection, in which the
investor’s State alone asserted its interests vis-à-vis the host State of
and must pay damages); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd v. Chile (MTD), Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/7 (May 25, 2004) (holding that Chile breached the Treaty and
must pay damages); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador (Occidental),
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICISD Case No. ARB/06/11 (Sept. 9, 2008) (holding that
the Tribunal has jurisdiction over the dispute involving the investment Treaty);
Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (Metalclad), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1
(Aug. 30, 2000) (holding Metalclad was not treated fairly or equitably under
NAFTA and that Mexico must pay damages); Técnicas Medioambientales
Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico (Tecmed), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 (May
29, 2003) (holding that Mexico has breached the Treaty and must pay damages).
56 See BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 551 (noting that actions are discriminatory
if directed against persons of a particular nationality or race; they are arbitrary
when they lack a normal public purpose).
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investment.57 Historically a breach of a contract with an alien alone
was not seen by the United Kingdom and other major capital
exporting countries as justifying diplomatic protection because of
adverse political side effects.58 Other conditions must obtain in
order for such a breach to qualify as a breach of an obligation to a
State or individual under international law.59 Traditional opinion
states that this holds true even if a contract contains a clause
making international law applicable to the contract. This follows
from the doctrinal view denying the existence of a universal
private law of contract, expressed by the PCIJ in the Serbian Loans
case,60 as well as from the fact that one of the parties to the contract
is not a proper subject of international law, and therefore the
contract is not a treaty.61
Specifically, customary international law provides redress for
expropriation (direct or indirect) in the case that a government
substantially impairs the value of an investment through unilateral
interference with a contract by legislative or administrative means
and the investor is not properly compensated. 62 Otherwise,
customary international law would also provide a remedy if the
State acted in so arbitrary a manner as to commit a “denial of
justice.” 63 In sum, if a host State incidentally breaches a contract
57 See Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 2, at 12 (Aug. 30) (stating that by taking up the case of one of
its subjects and resorting to diplomatic action on his behalf, a state is in reality
asserting its own rights).
58 See R.Y. Jennings, State Contracts in International Law, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L.
156, 157–60 (1961) (detailing the historical attitudes of countries towards
intervention in contract claims).
59 For a thorough analysis of the circumstances when the breach of a contract
with an alien could simultaneously be a breach of the law of State Responsibility,
see Amerasinghe, supra note 52.
60 See Serbian Loans Case, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) at 31 (July 12) (“Any contract
which is not a contract between States in their capacity as subjects of international
law is based on municipal law of some country.”).
61 See Derek W. Bowett, Claims Between States and Private Entities: the Twilight
Zone of International Law, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 929, 936 (1986) (“[T]he relevance of
international law is theoretically undeniable in such a case, but its practical
relevance is limited by the fact that international law contains no rules relevant to
a breach of contract as such.”).
62 See BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 553.
63 See JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 712 (1987)
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with an investor while exercising its police powers in a nondiscriminatory way without depriving the investor of the use or
value of the asset in whole or significant part and provides the
investor with an opportunity to contest the claim either in its own
court system with fair procedural protections or in another forum,
the host State has not committed an international wrong.
3.1.2.

The Jurisdiction of BIT Tribunals

States have further defined responsibility and remedies in
respect of the activities of one State’s investors in the territory of
the other through BITs and the investment chapters of Free Trade
Agreements. Under this special system, comprised of both public
international law and private law elements, rights arising from the
breach of a BIT’s standards for treatment toward the investor or
investments vest directly with the investor and not with the
investor’s State.64 The State of the investor has no residual interest
in the requested remedy, which is awarded entirely to the affected
investor. The award generally has no binding effect except with
respect to the individual cases and parties; awards are considered
commercial arbitral awards for purposes of enforcement. This subsystem of international law,65 created by BITs, is not confined to the
customary international law on State responsibility in relation to a
breach of contract.66

A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting from. . .
(2) a repudiation or breach by the state of a contract with a national of
another state (a) where the repudiation or breach is (i) discriminatory; or
(ii) motivated by non-commercial considerations and compensatory
damages are not paid; or (b) where the foreign national is not given an
adequate forum to determine his claim of breach or is not compensated
for any breach determined to have occurred.
Id.
See Zachary Douglas, The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 74 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 151, 185–89 (2003) (noting that investment treaties
confer an independent legal interest in investors).
65 See id. at 159 (explaining the “hybrid or sui generis nature of the legal
relationship between the investor and the host State that arises out of the
investment regime.”).
66 See James Crawford, Treaty and Contract in Investment Arbitration, The 22nd
Freshfields Lecture on International Arbitration 3 (Nov. 29, 2007), available at
http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/Freshfields%20Lecture%202007
.pdf.
64
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The dispute resolution clauses of BITs confer standing on a
national of a Party State who makes a covered investment in the
territory of another Party State concerning an irreconcilable
“investment dispute.” When a dispute falls under the subject
matter jurisdiction clause of an investment treaty dispute
resolution section and any procedural conditions agreed to by the
States have been satisfied, the investment treaty expresses an offer
of consent on the part of the State party to engage in arbitration
with the investor at the investor’s election. In determining whether
a dispute is within the scope of the treaty parties’ consent to
arbitrate, BIT Tribunals are indisputably bound by the law of the
interpretation of treaties, especially Articles 31 and 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“The Vienna
Convention”).67 However, it is often contended that the consent
under a BIT is more than merely an element of a treaty: James
Crawford, for instance, has characterized the consent clause as
contract, rather than a treaty, governed by international law that
springs into effect when the investor perfects the consent by
requesting arbitration.68
3.1.3.

Disputes with Public Entities over than the National
Government

Many of the cases dealing with contract issues that have come
before investment treaty tribunals originated as disputes over
contracts concluded with a local government, an independent
governmental authority closely associated with a national
government or under its authority, or a government-invested
entity. In these cases, investors have invoked the customary
international law rule of attribution to maintain the claim against
the host State in the treaty tribunals. If an entity is recognized as
“an organ of the central government” by the law of the country, or
if it is “empowered by the law of the State to exercise elements of
governmental authority,” and it is acting in that capacity, acts of
67 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in light of its object and purpose.”). This treaty approach to
interpretation of the consent to arbitrate reflects the reasoning of the majority of
Tribunals. But see id. art. 32 (discussing supplementary means of interpretation).
68 See Crawford, supra note 66, at 10–11 (describing a BIT as a treaty
containing an offer to arbitrate).
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that entity will be attributed to the State for purposes of
determining State responsibility.69 Thus, normally, the fact that the
counterparty to the contract in dispute is with a local government
or a government-owned company would not by itself
automatically bar a treaty claim against a national government,
despite the fact that it bars the contract claim against the national
government.70
3.2. Investment Treaty Arbitral Jurisprudence on Contract Claims
3.2.1.

Treaty Claims Versus Contract Claims: Vivendi

The most influential case to date setting out the principal issues
in the treatment of contract claims in BIT tribunals is the Vivendi
Annulment.71 In sharp contrast to the oil arbitrations of the earlier
era that considered international law and domestic law flexibly in
matters of contract, the Ad Hoc Committee in the Vivendi
Annulment pointedly distinguished treaty and contract claims
according to the source of rights invoked and insisted on their
resolution according to their respective sources of law.
The original Vivendi dispute centered on a thirty-year
Concession Contract for water treatment between a French
Company CGE (later purchased by Vivendi), and the Argentine
69 See Report of the International Law Commissionto the General Assemply, Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 4, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L 21 (declaring that “the
conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under
international law”); see also id. art. 5 (explaining that persons or entities that do not
fall under the purview of Article 4 may still be considered State actors so long as
they exercise certain elements of the governmental authority). But see id. art. 5,
cmt. 3 (noting that absent any stipulations in a treaty, the mere fact that an entity
was established or funded by a State is not enough for its actions to be attributable
to a State).
70 In order to make a contract claim in an ICSID dispute against a State subentity, in addition to satisfying the subject matter jurisdiction of the treaty, the
contract claims must involve a State sub-entity that was stipulated in advance. See
ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(3) (“Consent by a constituent subdivision
or agency of a Contracting State shall require the approval of that State unless that
State notifies the Centre that no such approval is required.”).
71 See Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina (Vivendi
Annulment), Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3 (July 3, 2002),
reprinted in 19 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 89 (2004) (coming to separate
conclusions with respect to treaty and contract claims according to their
individual sources of law).
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Province of Tucumán.72 The application for arbitration by CGE
claimed that certain acts and omissions of Argentina, including
those actions by the provincial authorities that should be attributed
to Argentina under international law, violated the expropriation
clauses and fair and equitable treatment guarantees of the France
Argentine BIT.73 The dispute resolution provisions of the BIT itself
expressly gave the investor the choice to bring a claim in domestic
courts or in international arbitration. The Concession Contract’s
forum selection clause, Article 16.4, provided for the exclusive
jurisdiction of the contentious administrative courts of Tucumán.
Argentina objected to jurisdiction of the BIT Tribunal on the
grounds inter alia that the only dispute presented by the Claimants
related exclusively to the Concession Contract, to which it, itself,
was not a party. It also argued the dispute resolution provision of
the Concession Agreement required the dispute to be submitted to
the courts of Argentina.74.
The original Vivendi Tribunal decided to separate the
allegations of the claimant into claims against the national
authorities (the federal claims) and the provincial authorities (the
Tucumán claims). With respect to the federal claims, the Tribunal
found that Argentina had not breached the treaty since the specific
allegations made by the Claimants concerned the acts of Tucumán,
and Argentina was under no duty to prevent or enjoin the actions
of Tucumán under the treaty. With respect to the local claims, the
Tribunal stated that the facts of the case made it impossible for it to
distinguish or separate violations of the BIT from breaches of the
Concession Contract without interpreting the Contract. Therefore,
it agreed with the Argentina’s objection that because the
allegations relating to the actions of the Tucumán authorities had
been assigned by the forum selection clause of the Concession
Contract to the administrative courts of Tucumán, the claimants
See Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Compagnie Générale des
Eaux v. Argentina (Vivendi I), Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, paras. 56–61
(Nov. 21, 2000), reprinted in 16 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 641 (2001)
(detailing the positions taken by each party to the arbitration).
73 See Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,
Arg.-Fr., art. 5, July 3, 1991, 1728 U.N.T.S. 298, 300 (providing for the protection of
the investments made by each contracting party against expropriation and calling
for favorable treatment should losses be suffered under certain circumstances).
74 See Vivendi I, paras. 40–55 (discussing whether or not the BIT Tribunal had
jurisdiction over the dispute).
72
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had a duty to first pursue their rights with respect to such claims in
the contractually agreed-upon forum.75
In this case, however, the obligation to resort to the local
courts is compelled by the express terms of Article 16.4 of
the [Concession Contract] and the impossibility, on the
facts of the instant case, of separating potential breaches of
contract claims from BIT violations without interpreting
and applying the Concession Contract, a task that the
contract assigns expressly to the local courts.76
In its 2002 Decision on Annulment, although the Annulment
Committee found no fault with the Vivendi Tribunal’s
determination of the federal claims, it held that the Tribunal had
manifestly exceeded its powers by failing to consider the local
claims on the merits, because these claims alleged breaches of the
treaty the Tribunal had held to be in its competence.77
Emphasizing the two autonomous systems of municipal and
international law, the Committee found that the Tribunal had
mistakenly referred the international claims to the local courts
solely on the basis of municipal law considerations. In so doing,
the Committee denied that a forum selection clause agreed to by
the parties could preclude the jurisdiction of a treaty Tribunal
when a breach of the treaty was claimed.
A State may breach a treaty without breaching a contract, and
vice versa, and this is certainly true of these provisions of the BIT.
[W]hether there has been a breach of the BIT and whether
there has been a breach of contract are different questions.
Each of these claims will be determined by reference to its
own proper or applicable law—in the case of the BIT, by
international law; in the case of the Concession Contract, by
the proper law of the contract, in other words, the law of
Tucumán. . . .78

Id. para. 81 (declaring that Article 16.4 provides clear remedies to the
Claimant and that any decision that requires an application of the Concession
Contract must be sought in the courts of Tucumán).
76 Id.
77 See Vivendi Annulment, paras. 111–12 (noting that the Tribunal could have
ruled on the facts concerning breaches of the BIT and yet failed to do so).
78 Id. para. 96.
75
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In the Committee’s view, it is not open to an ICSID tribunal
having jurisdiction under a BIT in respect of a claim based
upon a substantive provision of that BIT, to dismiss the
claim on the ground that it could or should have been dealt
with by a national court. In such a case, the inquiry which
the ICSID tribunal is require to undertake is one governed
by the ICSID Convention, by the BIT and by applicable
international law. Such an inquiry is neither in principle
determined, nor precluded, by any issue of municipal law,
including any municipal law agreement of the parties.79
A state cannot rely on an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a
contract to avoid the characterisation of its conduct as
internationally unlawful under a treaty.80
Referring to the Woodruff Case,81 the Committee reiterated the
view that the legal effect of a forum selection clause should depend
on the whether the fundamental nature of the dispute was
contractual or treaty-based. “[W]here the essential basis of a claim
brought before an international tribunal is a breach of contract, the
tribunal will give effect to any valid choice of forum clause in the
contract.”82
On the other hand, where “the fundamental basis of the
claim” is a treaty laying down an independent standard by
which the conduct of the parties is to be judged, the
existence of an exclusive jurisdiction clause in a contract
between the claimant and the respondent state or one of its
subdivisions cannot operate as a bar to the application of
the treaty standard.83
After the Vivendi Annulment, BIT Tribunals began to face
squarely the issue of jurisdiction over independent contractual
claims on a more frequent basis. Prospective contract claimants
attempted to advance breach of contract claims that were not
Id. para. 102.
Id. paras. 102–03.
81 Woodruff Case (U.S. v. Venez.), 9 R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 213 (U.S.-Venez.
Cl. Comm’n) 1903.
82 Vivendi Annulment, para. 98.
83 Id. para. 101.
79
80
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simultaneously treaty breaches by contending: 1) an umbrella
clause operating to convert a breach of contract claim into a treaty
claim vests the Tribunal with jurisdiction for the contract claim or,
2) a generally-worded dispute resolution clause referring to
“investment disputes” should be interpreted to include contract
claims.84 A few cases have considered the question of whether a
Most Favored Nation (“MFN”) clause can entitle an investor to
bring his or her contract claim to investment arbitration, because
the host State offers such a benefit to another country’s investors.
In practice, only a few tribunals have held in favor of independent
contract claims jurisdiction,85 and to the extent that investment
treaty tribunals have considered jurisdiction for disputes arising
out of contract claims, they have imposed various qualifications.
The overwhelming majority of cases have held that BIT Tribunals
will not have jurisdiction over a contract claim between a State and
an alien unless the government’s conduct at the time of the
contractual breach also breached a substantive obligation under
the treaty.86
84 See Emmanuel Gaillard, Treaty-Based Jurisdiction: Broad Dispute Resolution
Clauses, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 6, 2005, at 3 (noting that the Vivendi decision broadened the
field of potential investment claims under BITs); see also John P. Gaffney & James
L. Loftis, The ‘Effective Ordinary Meaning’ of BITs and the Jurisdiction of Treaty-Based
Tribunals to Hear Contract Claims, 8 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 5, 47–67 (2007)
(summarizing recent case law on umbrella clauses and broad dispute resolution
clauses).
85 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines (SGS
Philippines), Objections to Jurisdiction. ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para. 157 (Jan.
29, 2004), reprinted in 8 ICSID (W. Bank) 518 (2005) (“[I]t is not enough for the
claimant to assert the existence of a dispute as to fair treatment or expropriation”);
see also Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion, para. 262
(Aug. 19, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Eureko
-PartialAwardandDissentingOpinion.pdf; Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, para. 136 (Oct. 12, 2005), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf (“A breach of the [Share Purchase
Agreement] is, as a matter of law, capable of constituting a breach, attributable to
the Respondent, of the BIT . . . .). But see Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB/96/3 (Mar. 9, 1998), reprinted in 5 ICSID (W. Bank) 200 (2002)
(finding that Venezuela must repay the principle on promissory notes owed to
Fedax on the basis of the obligations clause of the U.S.-Venezuela BIT).
86 See, e.g., Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina (Sempra on Jurisdiction),
Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16 (May 11, 2005) (ruling that
the ICSID only offers narrow jurisdiction and that parties must meet its
requirements); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina (Sempra Award), Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/16 (Sept. 28, 2007) (separating license claims from the acclaim
that Argentina violated the umbrella clause of the treaty at issue), Pan Am.
Energy LLC v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections (PAE), ICSID Case No.
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Jurisdiction for Independent Contractual Claims under
Umbrella Clauses

At least twenty cases in treaty arbitration have dealt with the issue
of whether an umbrella clause internationalizes a State contract
claim. The first of these, SGS Pakistan, sets out a restrictive
interpretation of umbrella clauses, condemning the interpretation
that they confer contract claims jurisdiction on a treaty tribunal
except in extraordinary circumstances.
3.2.2.1.

The Restrictive View: SGS Pakistan

In 1994 the Claimant SGS entered into an agreement to provide
pre-shipment inspection services for imports to Pakistan and
estimates of customs revenues generated by the source country
(the “PSI Agreement”). Although it prescribed a five-year contract
period, the PSI Agreement allowed the parties to terminate at any
time after the first year as long as three months notice was given.
Its dispute resolution clause (Article 11.1) called for resolution in
accordance with the Pakistan Arbitration Act with the seat of
arbitration in Pakistan.87
The PSI entered into force on January 1, 1995, and the Pakistani
government gave notice of termination in January 1997. During
ARB/03/13, (July 27, 2006) (highlighting the separation of general international
law and treaty law), Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan (Impregilo), Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3 (Apr. 22, 2005) (discussing jurisdiction
over a breach of Italy–Pakistan BIT); IBM World Trade Corp. v. Ecuador, Decision
on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/10 (Dec. 22, 2003), reprinted in 13 ICSID
(W. Bank) 102 (2008) (ruling that the breach of the BIT was a separate issue legally
and jurisdictionally than a breach of a concession contract); AES Corp. v.
Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17, para. 94 (Apr.
26, 2005), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/AES-Argentina
-Jurisdiction_001.pdf (stating that the ICSID Tribunal “has no jurisdiction over
any breach of the concession contracts binding upon the companies controlled by
AES and the Argentine public authorities under administrative Argentine law,
unless such breach would at the same time result in a violation by the host State of
its obligations towards the U.S. private investors under the BIT”); Joy Mining
Mach., Ltd. v. Egypt (Joy Mining), Award on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/11, para. 30 (Aug. 6, 2004), reprinted in 13 ICSID (W. Bank) 121 (2008)
(calling for a careful review of all claims when “the parties have such divergent
views about the meaning of the dispute in light of the Contract and the Treaty.”).
87 SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan (SGS Pakistan), Decision
of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, paras.
11–15 (Aug. 6, 2003), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet
?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC657_En&caseId=C6
(describing the history and the terms of the agreement between SGS and
Pakistan).
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the intervening period services were performed and invoices were
paid partially by Pakistan. SGS filed a commercial claim in Swiss
courts for “wrongful termination of contract” that was dismissed
for reasons of sovereign immunity. In September 2000, Pakistan
invoked Article 11.1 of the PSI Agreement by asking the Supreme
Court of Pakistan to refer the decision to an arbitrator in
accordance with the Pakistan Arbitration Act, to which SGS
responded with counterclaims of “wrongful repudiation of
contract.”88
While these claims were pending, SGS initiated ICSID
arbitration against the government of Pakistan for violation of five
articles of the Swiss Pakistani BIT, 89 including: failure to promote
SGS’s investment (Article 3(1)), failure to protect SGS’s investment
(Article 4(1)), failure to ensure the fair and equitable treatment of
SGS’s investment (Article 4(2)), and expropriation without
compensation (Article 6(1)).90 SGS simultaneously asked the
Tribunal to find liability for breach of the PSI contract under an
“observance of commitments” clause, Article 11. SGS then
unsuccessfully made several attempts to stay the Pakistan
arbitration through local courts pending the outcome of ICSID
arbitration. Eventually the ICSID Tribunal recommended a stay of
the Pakistan arbitration until it had made a determination on its
jurisdiction, to which the Pakistani arbitrator agreed.
As recalled in the Decision on Jurisdiction of August 2003,
Pakistan’s central argument was that jurisdiction should be denied
because the claims were entirely contractual in nature,91 the treaty
claims comprising merely a relabeling of the previously submitted
contract claim. Citing the Vivendi Annulment, Pakistan argued
because the PSI agreement contained a valid forum selection clause
for the contract, it should be respected by the Tribunal. The
jurisdiction of the ICSID Tribunal is “limited to the adjudication of
disputes that the parties have actually agreed to submit to the
Id. paras. 16, 20–29.
Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Switz.-Pak., July 11, 1995, available at http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/as/1998/2601
.pdf [hereinafter Swiss Pakistan BIT].
90 SGS Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13. The complaint set out 8 heads
of compensation, including payment of outstanding invoices of U.S. $8,368,430.49,
compensation for lost profits of U.S. $31,500,000 and compensation for “lost
opportunities” of U.S. $70,000,000 which were substantially the same as those in
the Pakistan arbitration.
91 Id. paras. 43–44.
88
89
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Centre and not to an alternative forum” under the principles of
pacta sunt servanda and party autonomy.92 In the alternative, if BIT
claims existed that were not identical to the contract claims, the PSI
arbitration clause was broad enough to encompass them, therefore
all claims should be submitted to the Pakistani arbitration.93
3.2.2.1.1.

Holding on Contract Claims

Addressing the issue of whether it could adjudicate solely
contract claims, the Tribunal’s decision began with an analysis of
the validity and priority of the PSI Agreement arbitration clause.
“Article 11.1 of the PSI Agreement is a valid forum selection clause
so far as concerns the Claimant’s contract claims which do not also
amount to BIT claims, and it is a clause that this Tribunal should
respect.”94 It further denied that the wide dispute resolution clause
of the BIT, Article 9, referring to “disputes with respect to
investments” included contract claims. “That phrase, however,
while descriptive of the factual subject matter of the disputes, does
not relate to the legal basis of the claims, or the cause of action
asserted in the claims.”95
Accordingly, the Tribunal held that it had no jurisdiction with
respect to claims based on alleged breaches of the PSI Agreement
that did not also constitute or amount to breaches of the
substantive standards of the BIT.96
3.2.2.1.2.

Holding on the umbrella clause

Article 11 of the Swiss Pakistan BIT reads: “Either Contracting
Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the
commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of
the investors of the other Contracting Party.”97
In its textual analysis the Tribunal could not find specific intent
by the treaty Parties to “elevate” contract breaches to treaty claims.
Considering the widely accepted principle with which we
started, namely, that under general international law, a

92
93
94
95
96
97

Id. paras. 48–50.
Id. para. 70.
Id. para. 161 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. para. 162.
Id. para. 163 (quoting Swiss Pakistan BIT).
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violation of a contract entered into by a State with an
investor of another State, is not, by itself, a violation of
international law, and considering further that the legal
consequences that the Claimant would have us attribute to
Article 11 of the BIT are so far-reaching in scope, and so
automatic and unqualified and sweeping in their operation,
so burdensome in their potential impact upon a
Contracting Party, we believe that clear and convincing
evidence must be adduced by the Claimant [of shared
intent of such interpretation]. . . . We do not find such
evidence in the text itself of Article 11.98
Specifically, among other consequences, if Article 11
internationalized every contract claim, “there would be no real
need to demonstrate a violation of those substantive treaty
standards if a simple breach of contract, or of municipal statute or
regulation, by itself, would suffice to constitute a treaty
violation. . . .”99
The Tribunal considered that the umbrella clause could be
nothing more than “an implied affirmative commitment to enact
implementing rules and regulations necessary or appropriate to
give effect to a contractual or statutory undertaking in favor of
investors of another Contracting Party that would otherwise be a
dead letter.”100 The Tribunal could not find that
Article 11 of the BIT had the effect of entitling a Contracting
Party’s investor, like SGS, in the face of a valid forum
selection contract clause, to ‘elevate’ its contract claims with
another Contracting Party, like the PSI Agreement, to
claims grounded in a BIT, and accordingly to bring such
contract claims to this Tribunal for resolution and
decision.101
3.2.2.2.

The Expansive View: SGS Philippines

Six months after the SGS Pakistan proceeding, a Tribunal
adjudicated a dispute over a similar type of contract by an
98
99
100
101

Id. para. 167.
Id. para. 168.
Id. para. 172.
Id. para. 165.
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affiliated company under the Swiss-Philippines BIT.102 Based on a
differently-worded clause, its reasoning came to the exactly
opposite conclusion on jurisdiction over purely contractual claims
and the legal effect of umbrella clauses. However, its initial
holding led to a similar outcome by deferring to local courts for a
consideration of the amount due under the contract claim.
In 1991 the Republic of Philippines entered into a contract with
SGS for Comprehensive Import Supervision Service (“CISS”) to
verify the quality, quantity and price of imported goods prior to
shipment to the Philippines for an initial period of three years.
Article 12 of the CISS Agreement read: “The provisions of this
Agreement shall be governed in all respects by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
All actions
concerning disputes in connection with the obligations of either
party to this Agreement shall be filed at the Regional Trial Courts
of Makati or Manila.”103 The contract was extended twice with
amended services but was not renewed after the second extension
concluded in 2000. During the contract period, enormous volumes
of commerce were inspected and invoiced at U.S. $680 million but
a government inquiry found that only about U.S. $540 million was
paid.
SGS commenced ICSID arbitration based on breaches of clauses
of the Swiss-Philippines BIT guaranteeing full protection and
security (Article IV(1)); fair and equitable treatment (Article IV (2));
effective and adequate compensation in cases of expropriation
(Article VI(1)); and observation of obligations (Article X (2)) (the
umbrella clause).104
Among its objections to jurisdiction, the Philippines argued
that as the dispute’s essential basis was contractual, the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction was precluded by a previous dispute resolution
agreement in the CISS Agreement.105 “Article 12 represents a real
and genuine agreement, being the product of an arms-length
bargain of the parties which . . . resulted from a competitive tender
and bidding process.”106 It further maintained that the Swiss102 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, Decision
Jurisdiction (SGS Philippines), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para. 157 (Jan. 29,
2004), reprinted in 8 ICSID (W. Bank) 518 (2005).
103 Id. para. 22.
104 Id. para. 44.
105 Id. para. 51.
106 Id. para. 52.
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Philippines BIT had no application to purely contractual disputes
and denied the BIT was intended to override previous obligations
with respect to “specific investments.”107
With respect to the umbrella clause, the Philippines response in
part echoed the SGS Pakistan Tribunal’s reasoning:
SGS’s interpretation of Article X(2) effectively
emasculates the substantive protection contained in Arts.
III–VI. What SGS is effectively saying is that this
substantial body of international law practice is now to
be rendered effectively otiose because the Claimant need
no longer prove the additional element, it need only
argue that a breach of a private, commercial contract has
been violated by a State and yet still be able to pursue its
grievances in an international forum.108
3.2.2.2.1

Holding on the Umbrella Clause

The umbrella clause of the Swiss-Philippines BIT States: “Each
Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with
regard to specific investments in its territory by investors of the
other Contracting Party.”109 The Tribunal found that an analysis of
the clause’s mandatory wording, its order in the treaty text in the
substantive section, and the declared object and purpose of the
treaty supported the Claimant’s interpretation.110 But the Tribunal
stressed that the umbrella clause did not convert questions of
contract law into questions of treaty law, nor did it change the
proper law of the CISS Agreement from the law of the Philippines
to international law. Under Article X(2) the Philippines was
internationally responsible for the performance of the obligations
under the contract only once the terms had been ascertained under
the terms of the contract.111
The basic obligation on the State in this case is to pay what
is due under the contract, which is an obligation that is
assumed with regard to the specific investment (the
performance of services under the CISS Agreement). But
this obligation does not mean that the determination of
107
108
109
110
111

Id. para. 51(e).
Id. para. 76.
Id. para. 115.
Id. paras. 115–16.
Id. para. 126.
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how much money the Philippines is obliged to pay
becomes a treaty matter. The extent of the obligation is still
governed by the contract, and it can only be determined by
reference to the terms of the contract.112
3.2.2.2.2.

Holding on Contract Claims

The tribunal held that the dispute resolution clause of the
treaty referring to “disputes with respect to investments between a
Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting
Party”113 was intended to include contract claims because among
the fora, only the treaty Tribunal was competent to consider both
treaty and contract claims. Therefore, efficiency counseled treating
the claims in a single forum.114 But the Tribunal made clear that
the BIT could not override the effective and exclusive dispute
resolution clause in the CISS agreement, nor did the BIT “give SGS
an alternative route for the resolution of contractual claims which
it was bound to submit to the Philippine courts under that
Agreement.”115 Instead, the Tribunal decided that the significance
of the exclusive forum selection clause went to the question of
admissibility:
Thus the question is not whether the Tribunal has
jurisdiction: unless otherwise expressly provided, treaty
jurisdiction is not abrogated by contract. The question is
whether a party should be allowed to rely on a contract as
the basis of its claim when the contract itself refers that
claim exclusively to another forum. In the Tribunal’s view
the answer is that it should not be allowed to do so, unless
there are good reasons, such as force majeure, preventing the
claimant from complying with its contract. This
impediment, based as it is on the principle that a party to a
contract cannot claim on that contract without itself
complying with it, is more naturally considered as a matter
of admissibility than jurisdiction. . . . SGS should not be

112
113
114
115

Id. para. 127.
Id. para. 34.
Id. para. 132.
Id. para. 143.
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able to approbate and reprobate in respect of the same
contract . . . .116
Moreover, as the only issue effectively left to be decided was
the amount of the claim, the Tribunal held that until the question
of the scope of the Respondent’s obligation to pay is clarified,
either by agreement or submission to the Philippine court, that its
decision would be premature and ordered a stay for both types of
claims.117
3.2.2.2.3.

SGS Philippines Revisited

With no resolution forthcoming after three-and-a-half years,
the Tribunal in September 2007 informed the Parties that the stay
would be lifted in order to allow them to hold a hearing to present
their views on the State of the dispute and to decide whether the
conditions of admissibility still obtain.118 At the hearing the
Tribunal ascertained that the amount due on the invoice had been
satisfactorily determined by government accounting. It then
considered two additional issues.
First, the Claimant had
abandoned the request for contractual interest for the amount of
interest due on the unpaid invoice and instead requested the more
favorable compounded interest rate under international law.
Secondly, the Claimant alleged that due to fraudulent reporting of
export clearances in China, an additional U.S. $113 million in losses
had been sustained.
As to the interest, the Tribunal decided:
Its claim to international law interest for non-payment of
the amount due under Article X(2) of the BIT is predicated
on the finding of a breach of that article, and as explained
above, the conditions for the award of interest under
international law (which are in the discretion of the
Tribunal) have so far not been met.119
Concerning the “Chinese fraud” allegation, it stated:

Id. paras. 154–55.
Id. para. 175.
118 See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, Order of the
Tribunal on Further Proceedings, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, paras. 25, 27 (Dec.
17, 2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/SGSvPhil-order.pdf.
119 Id. para. 24.
116
117
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. . . it cannot be said that there is in any forum a distinct
dispute between the parties as to sums due by one to the
other arising from the allegation. In these circumstances it
is difficult to see how it could of itself preclude the
admissibility of SGS’s claim to payment under the BIT.120
Accordingly, because the Tribunal concluded that the
conditions for inadmissibility no longer obtained, it ordered the
parties to continue the treaty arbitration.121
The SGS Pakistan restrictive view of the legal effect of umbrella
clauses has been endorsed by such tribunals as those in Salini v.
Jordan,122 Joy Mining, Impregilio, El Paso,123 and PAE.124 The
tribunals in Noble Ventures, Eureko Mining, MTD equity, LG & E,
Siemens, Duke Energy, and Sempra125 took a more expansive view in
line with SGS Philippines. Among these, only the tribunals in Noble
Ventures126 and Eureko Mining127 accepted that a breach of a
contractual obligation was identical to a treaty breach. Many have
required a legislative or executive commitment in addition to those
made in the contract itself to trigger the operation of the umbrella
clause,128 and some have applied the umbrella clause only to the
breach of the legislative commitment itself and not to a specific

Id. para. 25.
Id. para. 28.
122 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. v. Jordan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/13, paras. 120–30 (Nov. 9, 2004).
123 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/15, paras. 84–88 (Apr. 27, 2006), reprinted in 21 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 488 (2006).
124 Pan Am. Energy LLC v. Argentina, Decision on Preliminary Objections
(PAE), ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, paras. 94–116 (July 27, 2006), available at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/PanAmericanBPJurisdiction-eng.pdf.
125 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina, Award (Sempra Award), ICSID Case
No.
ARB/02/16,
paras.
310–14
(Sept.
28,
2007),
available
at
http://icsid.worldbank.org
/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC69
4_En&caseId=C8.
126
Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11,
para. 136 (Oct. 12, 2005) available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Noble.pdf.
127 Eureko B.V. v. Poland, Partial Award and Dissenting Opinion, para. 262
(Aug. 19, 2005), reprinted in 12 ICSID (W. Bank) 335 (2005).
128 Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/04/19, para. 322 (Aug. 18, 2008), available at http://www.arbitration.fr
/resources/ICSID-ARB-04-19.pdf.
120
121
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commitment in a contract.129 One tribunal held that an umbrella
clause breach occurred by a violation of a power purchase
agreement because of assurances provided by the existing
statutory framework for energy regulation.130
3.2.2.2.4.

The Test of Pussiance Publique: Impreglio

A few tribunals have justified the limitation on contract claims
jurisdiction by reference to “the test of puissance publique.”
Under this principle, only government conduct in a sovereign
capacity can trigger the treaty’s protection through the umbrella
clause, not a mere contractual breach. The Impreglio Tribunal, in
considering whether the umbrella clause internationalized a
contract for construction of a barrage and water channel, expressed
this view:
Only the State in the exercise of its sovereign authority
(puissance publique) and not as a contracting party, may
breach the obligations assumed under the BIT. In other
words, the investment protection treaty only provides a
remedy to the investor where the investor proves that the
alleged damages were a consequence of the Host State
acting in breach of the obligations it had assumed under the
treaty. 131
3.2.2.2.5.

Joy Mining: Denying
Commercial Claims

Protection

for

Several tribunals have criticized the adjudication of contract
claims in treaty tribunals on the grounds that to allow it would be
“destructive” of the two legal orders, municipal and international.
The Joy Mining Tribunal considered a dispute arising out of a
Sempra Award, paras. 305–22 (Sept. 28, 2007).
LG&E v. Argentina, Decision on Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1,
para. 175 (Oct. 3, 2006), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents
/ARB021_LGE-Decision-on-Liability-en.pdf.
131
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction (Impreglio), ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/03/3,
para.
260
(Apr.
22,
2005),
available
at
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/impregilo-decision.pdf.
The “puissance
publique” test to determine whether a contractual breach may be asserted as a
breach of the BIT is discussed in Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v.
Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29, para. 180 (Nov.
14, 2005), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC523_En&caseId=C27#17.
129
130
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supply contract for longwall mining systems in a phosphate mine
(“the Contract”) between Joy Mining Machinery Limited and the
General Organization for Industrial and Mining Projects of the
Arab Republic of Egypt (“IMC”).132 The Contract and a later
Amendment Agreement required letters of guarantee for contract
performance and a timetable for release of these guarantees
connected to the performance and the achievement of certain levels
of phosphate production. The guarantee amounted to UK£ 9,
605,228, about two-thirds of the total Contract price.133 The
Contract contained an arbitration clause requiring “all matters in
dispute” to be settled under the rules of UNCITRAL through the
regional center for arbitration in Cairo after obtaining the consent
of the Ministry of Industry, or, through the Egyptian courts.134
Disagreements arose and persisted as to the causes of performance
problems. In the end, IMC paid the full purchase price of the
equipment according to the Contract but declined to release the
guarantees.
In bringing the dispute to ICSID, Joy Mining asserted that the
Contract was an investment under the United Kingdom-Arab
Republic of Egypt Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of
Investments (“the Treaty”) and that the failure to release the
guarantees was a violation of several provisions of the Treaty.135 In
particular it claimed that the equipment obtained by the letters of
guarantee had been expropriated, that free transfer of funds had
been prevented and that Egypt had failed to accord fair and
equitable treatment and full protection and security to its
investment.136 In addition, Joy Mining asserted that by virtue of
Article 2(2) of the Treaty, the umbrella clause, all violations of the
Contract were violations of the Treaty.137
The tribunal did not accept the characterization of the Contract
or the guarantees as investments for the purposes of the treaty.
Instead it considered the contractual arrangements for the
guarantees a “contingent liability.”138 Neither did it think it would
132
Joy Mining Machinery, Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, para. 15 (Aug. 6, 2004).
133 Id. para. 17.
134 Id. para. 92.
135 Id. para. 22.
136 Id.
137 Id. para. 68.
138 Id. para. 44.
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be possible to expropriate “a contingent liability.”139 Thus, it found
the entire dispute to be an ordinary commercial dispute. In the
absence of treaty claims, the tribunal held that it had no
jurisdiction. It reasoned:
The Tribunal is also mindful that if a distinction is not
drawn between ordinary sales contracts, even if complex,
and an investment, the result would be that any sales or
procurement contract involving a State agency would
qualify as an investment. International contracts are today
a central feature of international trade . . . . Yet, those
contracts are not investment contracts, except in exceptional
circumstances, and are to be kept separate and distinct for
the sake of a stable legal order.140
The tribunal further noted that “a basic general distinction can
be made between commercial aspects of a dispute and other
aspects involving the existence of some forms of State interference
with the operation of the contract involved.”141
The tribunal also stated:
Disputes about the release of bank guarantees are a
common occurrence in many jurisdictions and the fact that
a State agency might be a party to the Contract involving a
commercial transaction of this kind does not change its
nature. It is still a commercial and contractual dispute to be
settled as agreed to in the Contract, including the resort to
arbitration if and when available.142
Consequently the tribunal observed, concerning the umbrella
clause:
In this context, it could not be held that an umbrella clause
inserted in the Treaty, and not very prominently, could
have the effect of transforming all contract disputes into
investment disputes under the Treaty, unless of course
there would be a clear violation of the Treaty rights and
obligations or a violation of contract rights of such a

139
140
141
142

Id. para. 78.
Id. para. 58.
Id. para. 72.
Id. para. 79.
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magnitude as to trigger the Treaty protection, which is not
the case. The connection between the Contract and the
Treaty is the missing link that prevents any such effect.
This might be perfectly different in other cases where that
link is found to exist, but certainly it is not the case here.143
3.2.2.2.6.

Protection for Investment Agreements: El
Paso and PAE

A few tribunals have averred that entering into a contractual
relationship with an investor could trigger the protection of the
umbrella clause, depending on the nature of the contract. On the
view that it is “necessary to distinguish the State as a merchant or
as a sovereign,” the tribunals in El Paso, and its companion case
Pan American Energy, drew particularly on the distinction between
a contractual legal relationship between the State and the investor
that arises due to the State acting in a commercial capacity (jus
imperii) and a contractual legal relationship that arises due to the
State acting in a sovereign capacity (jus gestionis).144 Apparently on
this basis the El Paso and the PAE Tribunals declared that all
contracts constitute either commercial contracts or investment
agreements.145 Further, only investment agreement breaches could
be converted to treaty breaches by the umbrella clause. In other
words: “[those] contract claims stemming from an investment
agreement stricto sensu, that is an agreement in which the State
appears as a sovereign, and not all contracts signed with the State
or one of its entities . . . .”146
Offering little other explicit support for this theory, the tribunal
arrived at this conclusion in the particular case by interpreting the
umbrella clause in Article II of the Argentine-U.S. BIT, in light of
the dispute resolution clause, Article VII(1). The umbrella clause
reads: “each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered

Id. para. 81.
El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/15, para. 79 (Apr. 27, 2006).
145 Id. para. 77 (“Either the foreign investor has a commercial contract with an
autonomous State entity or it has an investment agreement with the state, in
which some ‘clauses exorbitantes du droit commun’ are inserted.”).
146 Id. para. 80. See also CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, paras. 299–300 (May 12, 2005) (noting “that not all
contract breaches result in breaches of the treaty”).
143
144
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into with regard to investments.”147 The dispute resolution clause
of Article VII(1) states:
[A]n investment dispute is a dispute between a Party and
national or company of the other Party arising out of or
relating to (a) an investment agreement between that Party
and such national or company; (b) an investment
authorization . . . or, (c) an alleged breach of any right
conferred and created by this Treaty with respect to an
investment.148
Read in conjunction with the dispute resolution clause, the
tribunal considered that the umbrella clause “will not extend the
Treaty protection to breaches of an ordinary commercial contract
entered into by the State or a State-owned entity, but will cover
additional investment protections contractually agreed by the State
as a sovereign, such as a stabilization clause inserted into an
investment agreement.”149
Furthermore:
[I]n the Tribunal’s view, it is especially clear that the
umbrella clause does not extend to any contract claims
when such claims do not rely on a violation of the
standards of protection of the BIT . . . unless some
requirements are respected. However, there is no doubt
that if the State interferes with contractual rights by a
unilateral act, whether these rights stem from a contract
entered into by a foreign investor with a private party, a
State autonomous entity or the State itself, in such a way
that the State’s action can be analyzed as a violation of the
standards of protection embodied in a BIT, the treaty-based
arbitration tribunal has jurisdiction over all the claims of
the foreign investor, including the claims arising from a
violation of its contractual rights. Moreover, Article II, read
in conjunction with Article VII(1), also considers as treaty
claims the breaches of an investment agreement between

147
148
149

El Paso Energy Int’l Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, para. 81.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol31/iss3/5

2010]

INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS

977

Argentina and a national or company of the United
States.150
3.2.3.

Jurisdiction for Contract Claims Under Wide Dispute
resolution clauses

An alternative method for seizing a treaty tribunal with a
contract claim is to argue the claim is an “investment dispute”
within the general consent to arbitration of investment disputes
under the treaty. The tribunal in Salini v. Morocco in July 2001151
addressed the question of whether a contract claim should be
considered an investment dispute under the Italy Morocco BIT
referring to: “[a]ll disputes or differences, including disputes
related to the amount of compensation due in the event of
expropriation, nationalization, or similar measures, between a
Contracting Party and an investor of the other Contracting
Party.”152 The tribunal held that this subject matter jurisdiction
clause included jurisdiction for contract claims in principle
although it ultimately rejected the contract claim at issue for other
reasons. The tribunal reasoned: “[t]he reference to expropriation
and nationalisation measures, which are matters coming under the
unilateral will of a State, cannot be interpreted to exclude a claim
based in contract from the scope of application of this Article.”153
The Vivendi Annulment Committee, considering the dispute
resolution clause of the Argentine-U.S. BIT, stated as well:
Article 8 does not use a narrower formulation, requiring
that the investor’s claim allege a breach of the BIT itself.
Read literally, the requirements for arbitral jurisdiction in
Article 8 do not necessitate that the Claimant allege a
breach of the BIT itself: it is sufficient that the dispute relate
to an investment made under the BIT.154

150 Id. para. 84. The Tribunal positively referenced the Model BIT in coming
to this conclusion, but did not explain why.
151 Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case
No. ARB/00/4 (July 23, 2001).
152 Id. para. 15 (quoting the Italy-Morocco BIT).
153 Id. para. 59.
154 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Vivendi Universal (formerly
Compagnie Générale Des Eaux), Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No.
ARB/97/3, para. 55 (July 3, 2002).
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As noted above, the SGS Pakistan Tribunal declined to read the
same meaning into Article 9 of the Swiss-Pakistani BIT, which
referred to “disputes with respect to investments.”155 The Tribunal
in SGS Philippines, in contrast, agreed with the claimant that the
contract claims should also be included in the phrase “disputes
with respect to investments” between a Contracting Party and an
investor of the other Contracting Party.156 The Tribunals in
Fedax,157 Impregilo,158 Tokios Tokelés,159 and Parkerings160 came to
similar conclusions.
3.2.4.

MFN and Contract Claims Jurisdiction: Impregilo, Salini v.
Jordan

While the application of an MFN clause to arbitration
procedures under BITs in general continues to be highly
controversial,161 two tribunals have rendered decisions specifically
on whether the investment tribunal had jurisdiction over contract
claims by operation of an MFN clause. In both cases the Tribunals
declined to accept this use of the MFN clause.
In Impregilo v. Pakistan an Italian company had entered into a
contract for the construction of a barrage downstream of the
Tarbela Dam with the Pakistan Water Power Development
Authority (“WAPDA”). The claimant argued that it could claim
the procedural benefit of arbitration of contract claims under an
umbrella clause in another treaty through the Most Favored Nation
clause in Article 3 of the Italy-Pakistan BIT. After determining
WAPDA to be separate from the government of Pakistan under
Pakistani law, the tribunal stated:
SGS Pakistan, Case No. ARB/01/13, paras. 149–50.
SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Philippines, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, para. 134 (Jan. 29, 2004).
157 Fedax N.V. v. Venezuela, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/3 (Mar. 9,
1998).
158 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/3 (Apr. 22, 2005).
159 Tokios Tokelés v. Ukraine, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18 (July 26,
2007).
160 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Lithuania, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/8 (Sept. 11, 2007).
161 See Emanuel Gaillard, Establishing Jurisdiction Through a Most-FavoredNation Clause, N.Y. L.J., June 2, 2005, at 37 (explaining the lack of consistency in
case law decisions regarding the application of Most Favored Nation status
clauses in the area of investment arbitration).
155
156
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[G]iven that the Contracts were concluded by Impreglio
with WAPDA, and not with Pakistan[,] Impregilo’s reliance
upon Article 3 of the BIT takes the matter no further. Even
assuming arguendo that Pakistan . . . has guaranteed the
observance of the contractual commitments into which it
has entered together with Italian investors, such a
guarantee would not cover the present Contracts—since
these are agreements into which it has not entered.162
More significant for the present purposes is the holding of the
Salini Tribunal, which considered the question of whether the right
to ICSID arbitration of a contract could be awarded through a
MFN clause despite a provision in the Jordan-Italy BIT mandating
the use of the procedure set out in the contract (Article 9).163 The
claimant brought both treaty and contract claims related to a
contract for the construction of the Karameh Dam between two
Italian companies and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation-Jordan
Valley Authority. According to the contract, the progress of the
work and the amount charged therefore was to be certified by an
Engineer appointed by the Ministry. The dispute resolution clause
67.3 of the contract concerned the situation when a dispute arose
over the Engineer’s finding. It specified arbitration was allowed if
both parties agreed to arbitrate, provided the government party
had to first obtain the approval of the Council of Ministers. When
the parties differed by approximately U.S. $28 million on the final
amount owing under the Contracts, Salini requested arbitration
under the aforementioned clause. When the Council of Ministers
decided that the Jordanian Courts should hear the dispute instead
of allowing it to go to arbitration, Salini brought a claim before
ICSID under the BIT.
Salini had argued Article IX of the Jordan-U.S. BIT and Article
6 of the Jordan-United Kingdom BIT giving U.S. investors in
Jordan “the right to submit investment disputes with the host State
to ICSID regardless of any clause in the investment agreement
providing for a different dispute settlement mechanism” made

Impreglio, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3, para. 223 (citation omitted).
Salini Costruttori S.p.A., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, para. 19 (citing
Agreement between the Government of the Italian Republic and the Government
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the Promotion and Protection of
Investments, 17 July 2000, available at http://www.agreements.jedco.gov
.jo/main/doc/Italyi96e.html).
162
163
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available to investors of the United States and UK “a dispute
resolution clause which is more favorable” than that of the JordanItaly BIT.164 Therefore, it argued the MFN clause Article 3 of the
Jordan-Italy BIT allowed the claimant to submit the dispute to
ICSID arbitration. Article 1 reads: “Both Contracting Parties,
within the bounds of their own territory, shall grant investments
effected by, and the income accruing to, investors of the
Contracting Party no less favorable treatment than that accorded to
investments effected by, and income accruing to, its own nationals
or investors of Third States.”165
The Tribunal endorsed the position of Jordan that the Contracts
were investment agreements within the meaning of the JordanItaly BIT, Article 9(2) which required the disputes to use the
procedure in the contract. Given this, the Tribunal could find no
intent in the MFN clause of the treaty, nor evidence from the treaty
practice to confirm that the parties intended dispute settlement to
be included in the MFN clause to counter the specific intent
expressed in the treaty’s dispute resolution clause.166
3.2.5.

Another Perspective: Waiver of Treaty Arbitration

In most of the cases above, the question of the jurisdiction of
the arbitral Tribunal founded under an investment treaty to decide
a contract claim for which a host-State forum has already been
designated has been treated mainly as a question of treaty
interpretation. The main question has been: has the Host State
consented to treaty arbitration of the contract claim? Some
tribunals have approached the issue from another perspective: has
the investor waived treaty arbitration under international law,
either expressly or impliedly by conduct, by recognizing another
forum for dispute resolution?
As a general matter, the dual public/private nature of the
rights under the BITs raises the question as to whether an
individual is capable of waiving the public interests rights
embodied in the treaty’s arbitration procedures. If the right to
investment treaty arbitration is held by the investor and the State
of his or her nationality simultaneously, may an investor alone
waive the State’s right to demand treaty arbitration for its
164
165
166

Id. para. 20.
Id. para. 66, art. 3.
Id. para. 118.
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investors?167 To the extent that tribunals believe such a waiver
possible, most require an explicit expression of waiver of ICSID
arbitration to be effective.168
3.2.5.1.

Waiver by Committing to the Exclusive Forum
Selection Clause

Respondent States have argued that by committing to the
bargained-for forum-selection clause in the contract when a BIT is
already in existence, the investor has waived the right to related
treaty arbitration. As noted in the cases above, this may be equally
viewed as an expression of the principle of party autonomy or
pacta sunt servanda, respected in both municipal and international
law. In practice, however, tribunals seldom hold an investor has
waived investment arbitration for breach of the treaty simply by
entering into an exclusive forum-selection agreement in a contract.
In this many Tribunals have followed the reasoning of the Vivendi
I Tribunal. The Tribunal held that entering into a forum selection
agreement as part of a contract could not constitute a waiver of
treaty claims because the subject matter or cause of action of the
claims was different.169
167 See Ole Spierman, Individual Rights, State Interest and the Power to Waive
ICSID Jurisdiction under Bilateral Investment Treaties, 20 ARB. INT’L 179, 206–08
(2004):

The question is whether the interests of the home state are sufficient to
oppose party autonomy and deny the investor the power to waive
international arbitration . . . . [T]he better view would seem to be that,
unless the bilateral investment treaty contains an explicit provision to the
contrary, there is a presumption that the investor has the power to waive
international arbitration.
Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia (Aguas), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision
on Jurisdiction, para. 119 (Oct. 21, 2005); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador
(Occidental), ICISD Case No. ARB/06/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 71 (Sept.
9, 2008) (citing Aguas, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, para. 119).
169 See generally Salini Construtorri S.p.A. v. Morocco, Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, para. 49 (July 23, 2001); Azurix Corp. v.
Argentina, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, para. 79 (Dec. 8, 2003); AES Corp.
v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/17 (Apr. 26,
2005); Enron Corp. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3 (Jan. 14, 2004); CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic (Neth. V.
Czech. Rep.), Award, (UNICITRAL Mar. 2003), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca
/documents/CME-2003-Final_001.pdf; Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de
Barcelona, S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/19 (Aug. 3, 2006); CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Award,
ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 12, 2005).
168
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Article 16.4 of the Concession Contract does not divest this
Tribunal of jurisdiction to hear this case because that
provision did not and could not constitute a waiver by CGE
of its rights under Article 8 of the BIT to file the pending
claims against the Argentine Republic. . . . [T]hose claims
are not based on the Concession Contract but allege a cause
of action under the BIT.
Thus, Article 16.4 of the Concession Contract cannot be
deemed to prevent the investor from proceeding under the
ICSID Convention against the Argentine Republic on a
claim charging the Argentine Republic with a violation of
the Argentine-French BIT.170
In the 1998 Lanco arbitration, the Tribunal rejected that
argument that investors had waived treaty arbitration by entering
into forum-selection clauses assigning the dispute to
administrative courts of the province.171 Even while the Tribunal
found the Concession Agreement to be an “investment agreement”
within the meaning of the dispute resolution clause of the treaty
requiring the use of the procedure in the investment agreement, 172
it denied that such a forum-selection clause could express consent
overriding ICSID jurisdiction, as administrative jurisdiction was
not selectable under Argentine law.173 Other tribunals such as the
one in Salini v. Morrocco have adopted Lanco’s reasoning to deny
effect to exclusive forum selection clauses.174
3.2.5.2.

Express Waiver: Azurix and Aguas Del Tunari

The Vivendi Annulment Committee opined that if a forum
selection clause in a contract purports to exclude the jurisdiction of
an international tribunal arising under the BIT, whether a
170 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/3, paras. 53–54 (Nov. 21, 2000).
171 Lanco Int’l v. Argentina, Preliminary Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case
No. ARB /97/6 (Dec. 8, 1998).
172 Id. para. 20.
173 Id. para. 19. An opposite view on exclusive forum selection clauses is
provided in Crawford, supra note 66, at 13 (maintaining that a treaty tribunal may
not adjudicate a claim over an exclusive foreign selection clause in a contract and
that “[p]acta sunt servanda is not a one-way street”).
174
Salini Construtorri S.p.A. v. Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID
Case No. ARB/00/4, para. 27 (July 16, 2001).
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contractual claim or a treaty claim, a clear indication of intent to
exclude jurisdiction would be required.175 The Azurix case176
considered whether express waiver of all other fora in the
contractual documentation for the bidding for a water purification
project pursuant to a privatization plan precluded ICSID
jurisdiction. Azurix’s request for arbitration alleged multiple
violations of the U.S.-Argentina BIT but no contract claims.
Argentina objected to jurisdiction on the grounds that all of the
contractual documentation relating to the investment provided
“for all disputes that may arise out of the bidding” an express
waiver of “any other forum, jurisdiction or immunity that may
correspond.” This waiver was annexed to each of the respective
forum selection clauses that committed to the exclusive jurisdiction
of the courts of contentious administrative matters of the city of La
Plata.177 Argentina also objected that a Clarification Circular by the
Privatization Commission had affirmed to some bidding
participants that the forum selection clause in the documents were
an express waiver of ICSID jurisdiction.178
Azurix argued, inter alia, that the two claims were based on
different sources of rights, and that if it had made a waiver, it was
only concerning contractual rights, not claims.179 It also objected
on the grounds that the Argentine Republic was not a party to the
Concession Agreements. Azurix also observed that Argentina’s
court structure in any case precluded Azurix from bringing a BIT
claim in provincial courts, while Article VII(2) of the BIT the
dispute resolution clause allowed the investor to choose between
national courts, a previously agreed upon forum or ICSID
arbitration.180
The Azurix tribunal held that the inclusion of an express waiver
“has not made a substantive difference to the exclusive forum
clause included in the concessions agreements considered by
ICSID Tribunals in Lanco or Vivendi I, since the acceptance of the

175 Compañia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina, Decision on
Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, para. 76 (July 3, 2002), reprinted in 6
ICSID (W. Bank) 340 (2004).
176 Azurix, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12.
177 Id. para. 26.
178 Id.
179 Id. para. 32.
180 Id. para. 35.
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exclusivity of a forum implies by definition the renunciation of any
other fora whether or not explicitly stated in the clause.”181
Furthermore, the Tribunal points out “that the rights under the
Concession Agreement and under the BIT are not the same and
that the generality of the waiver would exclude even the courts at
the federal level which would normally be competent to consider
claims against the Respondent.” The court ultimately holds that
the waiver does not apply to the claim Azurix brought before the
tribunal.
On the other hand, the Aguas del Tunari Tribunal182
distinguished express waivers and exclusive forum selection
clauses in its analysis.183 In principle, the Tribunal considered that
if the host State and the investor agreed separately to waive ICSID
arbitration expressly, such a waiver would be effective.184 As to
exclusive forum selection clauses, following the Vivendi Ad Hoc
Committee, the Tribunal denied that a forum-selection clause
could affect the jurisdiction of a BIT tribunal. “The Tribunal is of
the view that it is not the existence of the exclusive forum selection
clause that would be given effect by an ICSID tribunal, but rather
that the tribunal could, at most, give effect to a waiver implied
from the existence of an exclusive forum selection clause.”185 After
accepting the Claimant’s argument that the clause in the
Concession Contract at issue was not a true forum selection
agreement specifically excluding other fora, in dicta it went on to
opine that an exclusive forum selection clause could at least
arguably be deemed a waiver of treaty arbitration, provided that it
must deal with “the same matters and Parties and contain
conflicting obligations.”186 But an exclusive forum selection clause
alone would need separate, more conclusive proof of the parties’

Id. para. 80.
Aguas Del Tunari v. Bolivia (Aguas), Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/3 (Oct. 21, 2005) (holding that there is not sufficient evidence to
support an allegation of abuse of corporate form or fraud).
183 Id. para. 118.
184 Id. Para 114 n.89 (citing Article 26 of the ICSID convention as proof that
this was the prevailing view at the time of the Washington Convention after
Spiermann).
185 Id. para. 119.
186 Id. para. 111.
181
182
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intent for the Tribunal to infer a waiver.187 “A separate conflicting
document should be held to affect the jurisdiction of an ICSID
Tribunal only if it clearly is intended to modify the jurisdiction
otherwise granted to ICSID.”188
3.2.5.3.

Treaty-Based Waiver: Fork-in-the-Road Clauses

The waiver question also arises when an investor has actually
submitted the dispute to the designated forum before invoking
treaty arbitration. In many cases, a treaty may explicitly provide
that a waiver will be deemed when an investor submits an
investment dispute to a national court under the treaty’s “fork-inthe-road” clause. Intended to promote finality of decisions in the
two separate systems of law, municipal and international,189 a forkin-the-road clause says that once an investor has submitted a claim
to domestic tribunals, the investor has made a final election and
has waived his or her right to bring the claim to treaty arbitration
and vice versa. In the main, the investment treaty arbitral
decisions have required identity of parties, subject matter and
causes of action to give effect to a fork-in-the-road clause in a
treaty.190 Thus, these tribunals have held that a prior submission of
a contract claim would not cause a treaty claim to be waived.
3.3. Conclusion
From the foregoing we see that attempts by investors to recover
on breach of contract claims against host States under BITs have
met scarce success. BIT tribunals have mainly broadly justified
denying contract claims jurisdiction in terms of traditional public
international law and treaty interpretation, imposing a high bar to
187 See id. paras. 118–19 (explaining that, absent an indication of the parties’
specific intent to waive jurisdiction, ICSID has the “duty” to exercise jurisdiction).
188
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador (Occidental), Decision on
Jurisdiction, ICISD Case No. ARB/06/11, para. 71 (Sept. 9, 2008).
189 See, e.g., Champion Trading Co. v. Egypt, Award, ICSID Case No.
ARB/02/09 (Oct. 21, 2003) (finding that a prior submission activated fork-in-theroad clause).
190 See, e.g., Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v. Argentina (Vivendi
Annulment), Decision on Annulment, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, para 113 (July
3, 2002), reprinted in 19 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 89 (2004) (discussing
fork-in-the-road clause); Azurix, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, paras. 87–90 (stating
that the identity of parties, object, and cause of action were required to trigger the
fork-in-the-road provision).
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find State consent for such arbitrations. Umbrella clauses and
general dispute resolution clauses have often been found to be too
vague to justify independent contract claims jurisdiction in the face
of the predicted impact on the integrity and stability of the
international and domestic legal orders, the burden on respondent
States, and the renunciation of judicial authority by the host State
that would be implied by such an interpretation of the BIT.
As the presentation below of the key provisions on the
arbitration of investment agreement shows, the Model BIT
attempts to anchor jurisdiction for treaty arbitration of concession
contracts within this legal discourse while presenting a
compromise to the full internationalization of State contracts. And
yet, such a compromise is likely to raise similar objections as those
raised by the tribunals above to contract claims jurisdiction, along
with other, new ones, which will be discussed in the section that
follows.
4.

INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS UNDER THE 2004 U.S.
MODEL BIT: AN UNEASY COMPROMISE?

Contrary to the current practice in treaty arbitration discussed
above, in the U.S. Model BIT, the United States has put forth a
procedural mechanism specifically to arbitrate concession
agreement claims in investment treaty tribunals through the
standing offer of consent to arbitrate in the DRC. Although it is too
early to say whether the text of the investment agreement
provisions is likely to become as widely adopted in other
investment treaties as the umbrella clause has been, considering
the recent dynamic ongoing growth of BITs and FTAs particularly
in Asia, counterparties to treaties with these clauses should
carefully consider the wording of the DRC.
In drafting BITs, a principal problem for States is how much
protection for investors is necessary to induce foreign investment
for economic growth without sacrificing too much sovereign policy
discretion. Also of special concern these days is unduly exposing
the State to expensive litigation. As demonstrated by the $128
million award against Argentina for violating treaty commitments
inter alia the umbrella clause in September 2007,191 the balancing
game played by States concluding investment treaties is
191
Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina (Sempra Award), Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/16 (Sept. 28, 2007).
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increasingly fraught with peril. Considering these stakes, it is
noteworthy then that the United States has chosen to delegate its
judicial powers to private arbitrators for investment agreement
claims as set out in the treaty’s dispute resolution clause, thereby
constraining its policy options in this area of potentially strong
public interest. Whether the outcome will be consistent with the
stated overall goal of the Model BIT of promoting a “stable
framework for investment,”192 is far from clear.
4.1. The Structure of the 2004 U.S. Model BIT
The Model BIT was devised to either stand alone as a bilateral
investment treaty or constitute an investment chapter of a
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement. The key substantive
obligations described in Section A are as follows:
National treatment (Article 3); Treatment no less favorable
than that of the investors of the most favored-nation (MFN
Article 4); Free transfer of profits (Article 7); Minimum
standard of treatment for investors and investments under
customary international law (including fair and equitable
treatment and full protection and security) (Article 5); and
Fair market value compensation in case of legal
expropriation (Article 6)193
4.2. The Dispute Resolution Clause: The Agreement to Arbitrate for
Investment Agreement Claims
The procedural conditions for the States’ consent to arbitrate an
investment dispute are set out in Article 26. Article 26 requires a
claim to take place within three years of when the claimant first
acquired, or should have first acquired knowledge of the breach.194
It also declares a six-month waiting period and sets out certain
notification requirements before bringing the claim.
4.2.1.

The Subject Matter Jurisdiction Clause

Article 24 of the Model BIT authorizes three types of claims
which may be claimed alone or together: a breach of a substantive

192
193
194

Model BIT, supra note 3, pmbl.
Model BIT, supra note 3, Sec. A.
Id. art. 26.
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obligation under Article 24(1)(a)(i)(A) and a breach of an
investment agreement under Article 24(1)(a)(i)(C) or investment
authorization195 under Article 24(1)(a)(i)(B). A claim may be made
by the claimant on his own behalf or “on behalf of an enterprise of
the respondent that is a juridical person that the claimant owns or
controls directly or indirectly.”196 In contrast to treaty claims under
Article 24(1)(a)(i)(A), a breach of an investment agreement claim
clearly refers to a type of claim that can be considered
contractual.197
An investment authorization, bearing formal
resemblance to a license, can be considered an explicit assurance
regarding an investment. There are no limitations on whether the
two types of claims may be raised independently or in
combination.
4.2.2.

Claims for Breach of an Investment Agreement

4.2.2.1.

Definition of Investment Agreement

An investment agreement is a written agreement198 with a
national authority199 that grants rights to the covered investment or
investor:
(a) with respect to natural resources that the national
authority controls, such as for their exploration, extraction,
refining, transportation, distribution, or sale;

See id., art. 1 (“‘Investment authorization’ means an authorization that the
foreign investment authority of a Party grants to a covered investment or an
investor of the other Party.”).
196 Id. art. 24(1)(b).
197 See also Crawford, supra note 66, at 15 (discussing breach of contract
claims).
198 Model BIT, supra note 3, Section A, n.4:
195

[A] written agreement refers to an agreement in writing . . . that creates
an exchange of rights and obligations, binding on both parties under the
law applicable under Article 30[Governing Law](2).
For greater
certainty, (a) a unilateral act of an administrative or judicial authority,
such as a permit, license or authorization issued by a Party solely in its
regulatory capacity, a decree, order or judgment, standing alone; and (b)
an administrative or judicial consent decree or order, shall not be
considered a written agreement.
199 “For purposes of this definition, ‘national authority’ means (a) for the
United States, an authority at the central level of government . . .” Id. Sec. A, n.5.
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(b) to supply services the public on behalf of the Party, such
as power generation or distribution, water treatment or
distribution or telecommunications; or
(c) to undertake infrastructure projects, such as the
construction of roads, bridges, canals, dams, or pipelines,
that are not for the exclusive or predominant use and
benefit of the government.200
4.2.2.2.

The Underlying Qualified Investment Requirement

As a threshold matter, a claim for the breach of an investment
agreement must relate directly to a qualified investment that was
acquired in reliance on the investment agreement and that was
harmed as a result of the breach of the investment agreement.201
The definition of investment specifies loosely some typical
characteristics of investments for which a broad array of assets
may qualify.
Investment means “every asset that an investor owns or
controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an
investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of
capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the
assumption of risk.”202
This is supplemented by a non-exhaustive list of “forms that an
investment might take,” including certain types of contract rights:
(a) an enterprise;

200
201

Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 1.
A qualification to Article 24’s subject matter jurisdiction clause reads:

Provided that a claimant may submit pursuant to subparagraph (a)(i)(C)
or (b)(i)(C)a claim for breach of an investment agreement only if the
subject matter of the claim and the claimed damages directly relate to the
covered investment that was established or acquired, or sought to be
established or acquired, in reliance on the relevant investment
agreement.
Id. art. 24. This appears to harmonize the investment agreement clause with the
requirements of Article 25(1) of the ICSID convention that confers jurisdiction to
the ICSID Tribunal to “legal disputes arising directly out of an investment.”
ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 25(1).
202 Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 1.
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(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in
an enterprise;
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;
(d) futures, options and other derivatives;
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production,
concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts
(f) intellectual property rights;
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights
conferred pursuant to domestic law; and
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable
property, and related property rights, such as leases,
mortgages, liens and pledges.203
While some forms are “more likely to have the
characteristics of an investment,” other forms “such as claims
to payment that are immediately due and result from the sale
of goods or services, are less likely to have such
characteristics.”204
Of special significance to countries with federal systems is the
fact, that although an investment agreement may be entered into
only with the national government, an action by a local
government, such as a refusal to issue a permit, could be the cause
of the breach of the investment agreement by the national
government. In such cases, the claim might still be maintained
against the national government under Article 4 of the ILC Articles
on State Responsibility.205 Another notable aspect is that there is
no threshold showing of harm required to prove a breach of an
investment agreement requiring compensation.

Id.
Id. art. 1.
205 See Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico (Metalclad), Award, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para. 73 (Aug. 30, 2000) (explaining that this was the scenario
in Metalclad’s expropriation claim against Mexico).
203
204
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Conditions and Limitations to Bringing a Claim:
Waiver of Domestic Litigation

In either type of claim, Article 26 requires a claimant to provide
along with a 90-day prior written notice of intent to arbitrate a
written waiver of “any right to initiate or continue before any
administrative Tribunal or court under the law of either Party, or
other dispute settlement procedures, any proceeding with respect
to any measure alleged to constitute a breach referred to in Article
24.”206
This important clause performs a similar function to the lis
pendens doctrines in domestic law requiring a Tribunal to abstain
from taking up a case that is currently being litigated and
preventing the claimant from engaging in parallel litigation.
Claimants may continue to request injunctive relief only,
“provided that the action is brought for the sole purpose of
preserving the claimant’s or the enterprise’s rights and interests
during the pendency of arbitration.” However, in contrast to the
lis pendens doctrine requiring only identity of parties, cause of
action, and subject matter, this provision encompasses all related
claims arising from the challenged government measure.
4.2.2.4.

Governing Law of Investment Agreement Claims

The Governing Law Article 30 covering the substantive law of
the arbitration states that if the claim is for a breach of an
investment agreement, the Tribunal “shall apply:”
(a) the rules of law specified in the pertinent investment
authorization or investment agreement, or as the
disputing parties may otherwise agree; or
(b) if the rules of law have not been specified or otherwise
agreed:
(i) the law of the respondent, including its rules on
the conflict of laws, and

206

Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 26(2)(b)(ii).
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(ii) such rules of international law as may be
applicable.207
Thus placing heavy reliance on the principle of party
autonomy, an investment agreement claim will be decided by “the
rule” as agreed upon by the parties to the contract. The term “the
rule” is broad enough to include, as sources of decision, the law of
a country, public international law, or another system such as the
lex mercatoria or the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts.
The extent to which international law is applicable in the
unlikely case that the rules of law have not been agreed to is within
the discretion of the tribunal. In this context, the drafters of this
clause on the governing law of the investment agreement
arbitration appear to have drawn on ICSID Article 42(1), which
provides:
The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such
rules of law as may be agreed by the parties. In the absence
of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law of the
Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules
on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law
as may be applicable.208
A debate has long existed about the second sentence of ICSID
Article 42(1), as to whether international law should operate only if
there is a lacuna in domestic law or whether it should operate as a
corrective to domestic law.209 Some commentators interpret “and”
to mean that the tribunal is mandated to apply both domestic and
international law.
Tribunals have frequently adopted this
Id. art. 30(2). In the case of a breach of a substantive obligation, the
dispute shall be decided “in accordance with this Treaty and the applicable rules
of international law.” Id. art. 30(2).
208 ICSID Convention, supra note 7, art. 42(1).
209 See generally, Emannuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi, The Meaning of “And”
in Article 42(1), Second Sentence, of the Washington Convention: The Role of
International Law in the ICSID Choice of Law Process, 18 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L.J. 375 (2003) (discussing choice of law under Article 42(1));
Domenico Di Pietro, Applicable Law under Article 42 of the ICSID Convention: The
Case of Amco v. Indonesia, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION:
LEADING CASES FROM ICSID, NAFTA BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (Todd Weiler ed., 2005) (examining the
increasing role of public international law in resolving investment disputes).
207
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concurrent approach and used international law to resolve certain
issues in disputes over agreements governed by domestic law.210
Recently under the influence of the Vivendi holding, “an issue
specific” approach has been advocated. Where the claim raised by
the parties concerns a right or obligation defined under domestic
law, domestic law will be used, and where the right or obligation
arises under international law, international law will be used.211
Regardless of the approach adopted by the Tribunal, it is clear that
the tribunal is obligated at a minimum to identify the issue, the law
applied, and the outcome of the analysis.212
However, the award will not be annulled for errors in
application of the law.
[A] tribunal’s disregard of the agreed rules of law would
constitute a derogation from the terms of reference within
which the tribunal has been authorized to function . . . .
Disregard of the applicable rules of law must be
distinguished from erroneous application of those rules
which, even if manifestly unwarranted, furnishes no
ground for annulment.213
4.2.3.

The Award Clause

The Model BIT’s Article 34(1) permits the Tribunal to award
separately or in combination, only
(a) monetary damages and any applicable interest; and
210 CME Czech Republic (Neth. v. Czech Rep.), UNCITRAL Arb., paras. 167–
91, U.N. Doc. 403/LERMERK/2001 (2001); LG&E v. Argentina, Decision on
Liability, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, para. 93 (Oct. 3, 2006) (stating that obviating
the application of international law would mean ignoring that “international
treaties move away from the principle according to which foreign investment is
subject to the law and jurisdiction of the host state and seek international solution
of conflicts”).
211 The award of the Tribunal in Duke Energy, which found a violation of an
umbrella clause and of the fair and equitable treatment obligation, exemplifies
this approach. See Duke Energy Electroquil Partners v. Ecuador (Duke Energy),
ICSID Case No. ARB/04/19, paras. 315–488 (Aug. 18, 2008).
212 CME Czech Republic, para. 197 (discussing the consequences of applying
improper law).
213 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, Annulment Decision, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/8, para. 50 (Sept. 25, 2007).
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(b) restitution of property, in which case the award shall
provide that the respondent may pay monetary
damages and any applicable interest in lieu of
restitution.
A Tribunal may also award costs and attorney’s fees, while
punitive damages are specifically disallowed.214 The award clause
does not distinguish between treaty and investment agreement
claims. In fact, it is not clear that the award clause applies to a
breach of an investment agreement claim at all if the governing law
of the investment agreement is host state law.
In the BIT arbitrations with concurrent treaty and contract
claims so far, remedies from the treaty damage clause were only
allowed on a showing of a violation of international law.215 Does
the injunction to use “the rule” in the investment agreement to
decide the claim extend to the calculation of damages? In the case
that the investment agreement itself refers to liquidated damages
or incorporates statutory remedies, is the tribunal constrained to
award damages according to the “rule” in the investment
agreement itself to the exclusion of damages under the award
clause? Since the private party recovery under public contracting
laws is typically significantly less than for commercial contracts,
the difference could be considerable.216
Investors could claim damages for an investment agreement
claim as extensive as the full market value of the investment as
measured by present discounted value of future profits, which
roughly corresponds to expectation damages for private contracts
under “general principles of international law.” This is another
area where the investment agreement claims provisions will inject
uncertainty into investment arbitration.

Model BIT, supra note 3, art. 34(3) (“A tribunal may not award punitive
damages”).
215
See SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the
Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6 (Jan. 24, 2004) (involving a legal dispute
between a foreign investor and a host state); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of
Egypt, Award on Merits, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4 (Dec. 8, 2000) (involving a
dispute that arose from obligations to develop and manage two hotels).
216 See Bowett, supra note 40, at 50 (comparing international standards of
compensation for expropriation with U.S. laws on the termination of public
contracts).
214
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Summary

The provisions on investment agreements in the DRC give rise
to simultaneous duties of signatory States as follows:
1) Each State owes to qualified investors of the other treaty
party a duty to arbitrate an investment agreement claim
when the investor perfects consent by the terms of the
treaty;
2) Each State owes a duty to the other Treaty party as a
Treaty obligation to not interfere with the arbitration and
provide for recognition of the award and enforcement
when applied for on the State’s territory; and
3) Each State is obliged to afford compensation for a breach
of an investment agreement to investors of the other
party.217
To raise an investment agreement claim, a qualified investor
must show that there was a breach of a contract between an
investor and a State granting rights to provide public services,
develop natural resources or build infrastructure for public use.
The investor must have made a qualified investment in reliance on
the investment agreement; and the claim must relate directly to
harm to the underlying investment caused by the breach of the
investment agreement.
Is a breach of an investment agreement an international
wrongdoing under the DRC? It can be argued that the treaty
parties intended that a breach of an investment agreement would
engage State responsibility following the reasoning of the
Impreglio, El Paso and PAE cases, because the definition of
investment agreements corresponds to contracts concluded by the
State exercising specifically sovereign powers, such as granting
rights to natural resources or to offer public services.218 However,

Model BIT, supra note 3, arts. 23–36.
See El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/15 (Apr. 27, 2006) (involving a case wherein an umbrella clause
was interpreted as extending treaty protection to special “investment protections
contractually agreed by the State as sovereign”); Pan Am. Energy LLC v.
Argentina, Preliminary Objections, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/18 (July 27, 2006)
(holding that the contested provision in the agreement could not be considered an
217
218
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this conclusion would not be warranted. First, the main reason for
singling out and explicitly defining investment agreements must
be to eliminate any ambiguity as to the State’s consent to the
relinquishment of sovereign authority over the adjudication of
these contracts traditionally in the realm of domestic adjudication.
Secondly, the DRC’s structure separating the investment
agreement claim provisions from the substantive obligation section
of the treaty obviates any inference of State responsibility for
breach of an investment agreement. Finally, it is hard to find
support for such a theory in customary international law, which
has tended to emphasize the nature of the act causing the breach
rather than the nature of the contract at issue.219 Neither would
such an interpretation accord with the majority opinion in treaty
tribunals.
Even though the investment agreement provisions do not
automatically invoke State responsibility in international
investment agreement claims, overall they represent a
compromise220 on the internationalization issue. The investment
agreement prong of the subject matter jurisdiction clause embodies
the modern version of the umbrella clause whose purpose is to
externalize concession contract claims from host State judicial
processes. Moreover, using a general formulation for breach of an
investment agreement originally derived for any kind of ICSID
investment dispute, the governing law clause authorizes tribunals
to substitute international law for domestic law to certain aspects
of the investment agreement claim. In as much as investment
tribunals have largely prevented the application of international
law to concession contracts by rejecting contract claims altogether
in investment treaty arbitration, the governing law clause marches
one step further down the road of internationalization of State
contracts. This compromise will leave the door open for investors
and their lawyers to further explicate the body of transnational law
for State contract claims in opposition to doctrines upholding the

umbrella clause which would change contract claims into breaches of
international law).
219 See Amerasinghe, supra note 52, at 884 (describing state breaches of
contracts with aliens).
220 See Crawford, supra note 66, at 3, 20 (describing the Model BIT’s DRC as
the “the integrationist approach” to international law).
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sovereignty of States in public contracting and the disposition of
natural resources.221
4.3. A Short List of Issues Raised for Arbitral Tribunals
The investment agreement provisions present an acute case of
what Zachary Douglass has described as a “symmetrical
jurisdictional conflict.”222 A symmetrical jurisdictional conflict
occurs when a treaty tribunal exercises jurisdiction over a claim
with a cause of action in municipal law. In contrast to previous
cases with concurrent treaty and contract claims, these cases
asserting a breach of an investment agreement may involve an
identity of party, claim and subject matter with a domestic contract
claim. Consequently, tribunals will be faced with conflicting legal
mandates that have not been dealt with directly in treaty
arbitration before.
4.3.1.

Forum Selection Clauses

For example, what effect should be given the designation of a
home State forum for resolution of disputes in the investment
agreement when the triple identity conditions are satisfied? With
no express clarification that the treaty overrides forum selection
clauses in investment agreement claims, the text of the DRC is
generally inconclusive as to the treatment of such clauses. A case
can be made that the tribunal should honor the forum in the
dispute resolution of the investment agreements as the
consensually agreed upon “rule” of the investment agreement. In
support of this approach, the fundamental basis of an investment
agreement claim is a contract: under the reasoning of the Vivendi
Ad Hoc and the Woodruff Tribunals, the claim should be
submitted to the forum designated in the contract and the
investment treaty tribunal would lack jurisdiction. If the tribunal
takes the position that its jurisdiction cannot be abrogated by a
matter of municipal law because this might allow the home State to
evade its international law obligation to arbitrate the investment
221 See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11,
para. 36 (Sept. 9, 2008) (demonstrating that, in addition to the doctrine of
permanent sovereignty over resources, host States have also mounted defenses,
mostly unsuccessfully, based on mandatory laws forbidding the commercial
arbitration of public contracts).
222 Douglas, supra note 64, at 241–56.
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agreement claim, then the investor should be held to have waived
treaty arbitration. This logically follows because with the triple
identity condition met, there should be no need for an explicit
waiver of the investment agreement claim. From this perspective,
a designation of a home State tribunal in the forum selection clause
would call for a stay, as in the SGS Philippines case.223
On the other hand, in countries where administrative
resolution in domestic courts is not selectable or is part of the
mandatory laws of the host State, claimants may argue (as in
Occidental Petroleum) that the forum-selection clause cannot express
consent.224 In this case, the DRC could be viewed as the only true
expression of consent (the rule “as otherwise agreed” under the
governing law clause) and as lex specialis. Under this reasoning,
the tribunal would be bound to take up the investment agreement
claim in spite of a forum selection clause.
4.3.2.

Consideration of Previous Decisions by National Courts

Another critical legal issue the tribunal will face for the first
time is whether a tribunal exercise its jurisdiction over an
investment agreement claim when a national tribunal has already
rendered a decision on the same contract dispute, and if so, under
what conditions? The 2004 Model BIT does not contain a “fork in
the road” clause, and although some treaties relying on it such as
the Korean-United States Free Trade Agreement have incorporated
such clauses, investment agreement claims are expressly not
covered. By omission, the DRC would seem to allow a “second
bite” for previously litigated investment agreement claims in some
situations. Provided the conditions of the domestic waiver
requirements of Article 11.18 are met, if the investment agreement
claim has already been dealt with in a domestic forum, the DRC
does not by itself bar alternative treaty tribunal jurisdiction over
the investment agreement claim.
However, for an international tribunal to assume concurrent
jurisdiction over such a contract claim without allowing the
exhaustion of domestic remedies is contrary to customary
international law.

See id. at 283 (discussing “stay test” based on whether the “fundamental
basis of the claim” is an investment contract or a treaty).
224 See Occidental Petroleum Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, para. 36
(examining the Tribunal’s claims to jurisdiction over the case).
223
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When the act complained of is a breach of local law only,
then it is only the subsequent conduct of the state of the
forum which can create responsibility. If the authorities
there interfere with the course of justice or certain
standards are not observed, then a denial of justice has
occurred and responsibility results from it.225
In treaty arbitration practice, although the ICSID convention
provides that the participant States have waived the domestic
remedies requirement, tribunals have nevertheless been generally
hesitant to review the decisions of domestic courts on matters of
domestic law at any stage of litigation. Two cases in particular
illustrate this point.226
In the Lowen case, the claimant alleged a denial of justice under
NAFTA’s minimum standard of treatment provision Article 1105
when the Mississippi Supreme Court required the claimant to post
125% of the judgment to stay the execution of an adverse award, in
this case amounting to $625 million dollars. The treaty tribunal
rejected the claimants’ allegation of denial of justice because the
Mississippi court order lacked the requisite “finality of action” that
would allow for it to assume jurisdiction over the claim. In other
words, because the claimant had not sought U.S. Supreme Court
review, the treaty tribunal would not consider the denial of justice
claim.227
In the Mondev case, a claimant similarly claimed a breach of the
obligation to provide the minimum standard of treatment required
by NAFTA Article 1105 based on rejection of its claims in the
domestic court system. When a real estate developer that Mondev
came to own filed suit against the City of Boston and Boston
Redevelopment Authority over a real estate assessment a contract,
the Massachusetts court dismissed the claim holding that the
Boston Redevelopment Authority had sovereign immunity. In
contrast to the Lowen case, however, the decision of the
BROWNLIE, supra note 49, at 497.
See Benjamin Klafter, International Commercial Arbitration as Appellate
Review: NAFTA Chapter 11, Exhaustion of Local Remedies and Res Judicata, 12 U.C.
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y, 409, 417–29 (2006) (presenting the Lowen and the Mondev
cases as instances wherein tribunals refused to review domestic court decisions).
227 See Mondev Int’l Ltd. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/99/2,
para. 144 (Oct. 11, 2002) (discussing the international jurisprudence on the
immunities of public authorities).
225
226
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Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was final under U.S. law
and the claimant had exhausted all remedies in the U.S. Court
System. Deferring to the Massachusetts court, the NAFTA
Tribunal stated:
[I]t is one thing to deal with unremedied acts of the local
constabulary and another to second-guess the reasoned
decisions of the highest courts of a State. Under NAFTA,
parties have the option to seek local remedies. If they do so
and lose on the merits it is not the function of NAFTA
tribunals to act as courts of appeal.228
The Tribunal went further, saying that “[w]ithin broad limits, the
extent to which a State decides to immunize regulatory authorities
from suit for interference with contractual relations is a matter for
the competent organs of the State to decide.”229
These decisions underscore the delicate balance treaty tribunals
must strike when confronted with jurisdictional conflicts. The
matter is much more complicated when both the domestic tribunal
and the treaty tribunal have concurrent jurisdiction over a contract
claim. Although res judicata is recognized in both municipal and
international law, international law tribunals are not required to
give res judicata effect to municipal law decisions. If a treaty
tribunal assumes jurisdiction over an investment agreement claim
based on a contract governed by domestic law, even if it exercises
strong deference to the decisions of national tribunals, it is unlikely
it can avoid theoretical conflict entirely. Because tribunals will be
applying an uncertain mix of international and domestic law in an
area traditionally reserved for domestic law under the relatively
lax standards of review in the investment arbitration system, the
provisions could produce conflicting and unstable outcomes in
fairly common investment situations for some time. With these
consequences, a strong international policy argument can be made
that tribunals should not take up previously litigated investment
agreement claims: 1) unless or until a treaty claim such as denial of
justice is simultaneously claimed or 2) the parties originally
228 Id. para. 126 (proposing that the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule be
introduced NAFTA arbitration); see also Gus van Harlen & Martin Coughlin,
Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT’L L., 121, 121–50 (2006) (asserting that investment treaty arbitration is a
powerful form of international administrative law review).
229 Mondev Int’l Ltd., ICSID Case No. ARB/(4f)/99/2 para. 154.
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specified international arbitration under international law in the
investment agreement.
4.3.3.

The Relationship between the Investment Agreement Breach
and Treaty Breaches

Arbitral tribunals will have to consider what role the Treaty
Parties expected the investment agreement claims to play in
relationship to the other substantive obligations for investor
protection set out in the treaty. Considering the many cases230 in
which concession contract investors have successfully protected
their legitimate investment-backed expectations concerning their
concession project by asserting a breach of fair and equitable
treatment, there is a clear need in applying the investment
agreement claims to distinguish them from the other treaty
protections in the international law context. In contemporary
investment treaty practice, a claim for fair and equitable treatment
covers both a denial of justice and a discriminatory breach of an
investment agreement.
Since the breach of an investment
agreement is not per se internationally wrongful, one such
distinction may be the applicability of the treaty’s damage award
clause to the respective types of claims. In the following Section, I
argue the preferable interpretation is one that limits the relief that
an investor claiming a breach of an investment agreement may
receive under the award clause to breaches that amount to clear
violations of international law or the treaty provisions.
Additionally, the investment agreement claim provisions may
under some conditions grant some additional protection to
investors when States have committed to a valid stabilization
clause in the investment agreement.
5.

INVESTMENT AGREEMENT CLAIMS AND THE POLICE POWERS OF
STATES

As discussed above, under the broadest interpretation,
investment agreement provisions would make any government
action in violation of the investment agreement that impose
financial burdens on a related investment a form of compensable
liability. The definition of investment is broad enough to ensnare
unwary governments in unexpected and expensive treaty
230 See cases cited supra note 85 (involving jurisdictional decisions regarding
breach of contract claims).
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arbitration litigation for run-of-the-mill environmental regulation.
Considering the competitive pressures developing country States
face to induce multinational foreign investment and the amount of
money at stake in investment arbitration relative to the fiscal
resources of such States, these treaty commitments are likely to
substantially hinder the already weak enforcement of
environmental and health regulation in developing States that
become signatories. But should governments be expected to waive
their rights to respond to scientific discoveries concerning health
and the environment over many decades for fear of punitive
investment arbitration?
5.1. Expropriation and Non-Discriminatory Regulation in Investment
Treaty Arbitration
5.1.1. Experience prior to the U.S. Model BIT
NAFTA purports to address environmental concerns in Article
12 (also in the U.S. Model BIT):
Article 12: Investment and Environment. The Parties
recognize that it is inappropriate to encourage investment
by weakening or reducing the protections affected in
domestic environmental laws. Accordingly, each Party
shall strive to ensure that it does not waive or otherwise
derogate from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate
from, such laws in a manner that weakens or reduces the
protections afforded in those laws as an encouragement for
the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention of an
investment in its territory. If a Party considers that the
other Party has offered such an encouragement, it may
request consultation with the other Party and the two
Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such
encouragement.
2. Nothing in this treaty shall be construed to prevent a
Party from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure
otherwise inconsistent with this Treaty that it considers
appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its
territory is undertaken in a manner sensitive to
environmental concerns.
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This language did not stem the cascade of investor claims
challenging environmental or health regulations as indirect
expropriations or as breaches of the obligation of fair and equitable
treatment,231 most often for indirect expropriation. (Nor have these
clauses figured much in those arbitrations.) The line between
compensable indirect expropriations and non-compensable
regulation is not clear in international law: not all regulations may
be considered indirect expropriations.232 In particular, much
authority supports the conclusion that in order to be found a
compensable expropriation, a regulation must contain a
discriminatory element.
Article 1 of the Protocol 1 to the European Convention on
Human Rights states:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of its possessions. No one should be deprived of

231 See SCOTT SINCLAIR, CANADIAN CTR. FOR POL’Y ALTERNATIVES, NAFTA
CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES (2008); see also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NAFTA
INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATIONS,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3439.htm
(summarizing cases filed under NAFTA involving the United States, Mexico, and
Canada); Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, Award on Jurisdiction, 38 I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA
Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998) (challenging ban on MMT); Sunbelt Water v. Canada, 38
I.L.M. 698 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 1998) (discussing water protection
legislation); Chemtura Corp. v. Canada (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2001)
(discussing ban on pesticide lindane); Albert Connolly v. Canada, Notice of Intent
to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2004) (discussing
order under natural heritage protection program); Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico,
Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (Aug. 30, 2000) (discussing failure to
grant operating permit pursuant to waste management regulations, designation of
site as ecological buffer zone); Glamis Gold v. United States, Award (NAFTA Ch.
11 Arb. Trib. 2003) (relating to preservation of Indian sacred sites in a mining
operation); Methanex v. United States (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. Aug. 2005)
(challenging California ban on MTBE); Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A.
v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2 (May 29, 2003) (challenging
the revocation of a permit for a toxic waste facility). Dow Chemical recently
announced the application for NAFTA arbitration to challenge a Canadian
pesticide ban. Also in progress is Baird v. United States, Notice of Intent to
Submit a Claim to Arbitration (NAFTA Ch. 11. Arb. Trib. 2002) in which an
investor owning a patent in the U.S. for the disposal of toxic chemicals alleges that
this “investment” has been expropriated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1995,
1997, and 1999.
232 See Catherine Yannaca-Small, “Indirect Expropriations” and the “Right to
Regulate” in International Investment Law (OECD Working Paper No. 2004/4, 2004)
(discussing indirect expropriation in international investment law).
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his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by the law and by the general
principles of international law.
The proceeding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with
the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or
other contributions or penalties.233
The Commentary to the American Restatement of the Law of
Foreign Relations similarly provides in this context
A State is not responsible for loss of property or for other
economic disadvantage resulting from bona fide general
taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of
the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police
power of States, if it is not discriminatory. . . .234
In practice, however, in expropriation cases investment
tribunals have often applied domestic U.S. regulatory takings
doctrine235 in favor of investors, disregarding whether the
regulations were a nondiscriminatory exercise of State police
powers in their findings of breach or in their decision on the
amount of the award.
Thus the Tribunal in Compania del Desarrollo de Santa Elana SA v.
Costa Rica Award of 17 February 2000 concluded:
Expropriatory environmental measures—no matter how
laudable and beneficial to society as a whole—are in this
respect, similar to any other expropriatory measures that a
State may take in order to implement its policies: where
property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes,

233 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Protocol I, art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at
http://www.conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/Treaties/html/005.htm.
234 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §
712(1), cmt. G (1987).
235 For an exposition of the U.S. takings doctrine, see Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (examining the constitutionality of appellees’
actions via the Taking Clause).
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whether domestic or international, the State’s obligation to
pay compensation remains.236
This was cited with approval by the Tribunal in the Tecmed
case based on the Spanish-Mexican BIT.237 In a NAFTA claim, the
Metalclad Tribunal refused to consider the motivation for a local
government’s issuance of an ecological decree and denial of a
permit for the operation of a waste management facility when it
found Mexico had expropriated the investment based on a public
service concession contract.
[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only open,
deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in
favour of the host State, but also covert or incidental
interference with the use of property which has the effect of
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the
use of reasonably-to-be expected economic benefit of
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the
host State.238
As Philippe Sands has pointed out, these results at odds with
domestic and international environmental law stem from the
current fragmented State of international law overall.239 National
and international environmental laws have not been integrated
with international economic laws while investment tribunals have
mainly adopted a hierarchy preferring international economic
law.240
While the international environmental norm of the
“Polluter Pays” would favor environmental enforcement,
investment tribunals are more likely to find an impermissible
236 Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA v. Costa Rica (Santa Elena),
ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, para. 72 (Feb. 17, 2000).
237
See Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB (AF)/00/2, para. 121 (May 29, 2003) (finding “no principle stating
that regulatory administrative actions are per se excluded from the scope of the
Agreement”).
238 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Award, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, para.
103 (Aug. 30, 2000).
239 See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
1070–71 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003) (1995) (describing the Santa Elena case).
240 Philippe Sands, Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the
Progressive Development of International Environmental Law, OECD GLOBAL FORUM
ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT (March 27–28, 2008), available at http://www.oecd
.org/dataoecd/45/7/40311090.pdf.
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barrier to trade in environmental regulation. A good example of
this is the SD Meyers case, which did in fact allege discriminatory
treatment but is nonetheless remarkable for the degree to which
trade law drove the outcome of the dispute to override
international environmental law.
Claimants challenged a
Canadian ban on the importation of PCBs and PCB wastes
pursuant to Canada’s obligations under the 1989 Convention on
the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal. The investment arbitral tribunal cited WTO
dispute panel precedents to hold that Canada’s ban was intended
to reduce import competition from the United States and therefore
violated the National Treatment obligation.241
The holding
amounts to international administrative review of Canada’s
environmental laws.242
Where a State can achieve its chosen level of environmental
protection through a variety of equally effective and reasonable
means, it is obliged to adopt the alternative that is most consistent
with open trade. This corollary is consistent with the language and
the case law arising from the WTO family of agreements.243
5.1.2.

Expropriation and Non-Discriminatory Regulation under
the U.S. Model BIT

Responding to the objections of NGOS and States, Annex B 4(b)
of the U.S. Model BIT clarifies the scope of regulatory takings:
(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory
regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied
to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safeties, and the environment, do not
constitute indirect expropriations.244

241 S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, First Partial Award (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib.
2000) paras. 258–66, available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/disputes_canada
_sdmyers.htm.
242 See Klafter, supra note 226, at 419.
243 S.D. Meyers, Inc., para. 221.
244 Model BIT, supra note 3, Annex B(4)(b).
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5.2. The Conflict between Investment Agreement Claims and Nondiscriminatory Regulation
In an investment agreement claim, on the other hand, the treaty
contains no express similar limitation barring claims based on nondiscriminatory regulation for the public purpose. Neither, of
course, would the claimant in an investment agreement claim have
to show that she was deprived of the use of the whole or a
significant portion of the value of the investment as in an
expropriation claim. At the same time, as the particular scope of
investment agreements triggers sovereign duties for the
stewardship of natural resources, the enforcement of the
obligations in investment agreement claims under the DRC are
even more likely to come into conflict with non-discriminatory
environmental policy-making.
The Azurix case illustrates how natural resource concessions
easily become a flash point for conflicts between investment law
and domestic laws for natural resources management.245 Azurix
Corporation, a subsidiary of Enron, acquired a Concession to
provide potable water and operate sewage treatment facilities in
Buenos Aires. After local water supplies became contaminated
with toxic bacteria, the government urged the residents not to
drink the water and to minimize exposure, imposing a fine on
Azurix for violating the concession agreement. Further, the water
authorities issued regulations disallowing Azurix to bill its
customers during the water crisis. Azurix, arguing the bacteria
contamination was due to the local government’s failure to provide
agreed upon infrastructure, complained that the billing prohibition
amounted to an expropriation and a breach of the duty of fair and
equitable treatment under the U.S.-Argentine BIT. Although the
tribunal found a breach of contract in favor of the investor, because
the investor had not been found to have been deprived in whole or
in significant part of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of its investment, it did not find an expropriation
had taken place. Finding a breach of the obligation of fair and
equitable treatment, the tribunal stressed the legitimate
expectations of the investor at the time of entering into the
investment as the primary consideration.246 The tribunal awarded

245
246

Azurix Corp. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12 (July 14, 2006).
Id. paras. 316–23.
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Azurix for U.S. $165 million of the more than $600 million it was
claiming.247 Argentina has applied for an annulment.
Kate Miles has pointed out the imminent prospective conflict
between global-warming related regulation and international
investment law;248 conflict is especially likely to crop up over
investment agreements in the energy sector. A wide array of
activities connected to energy production and distribution are
likely to be impacted by cap-and-trade, emissions quotas and other
techniques for mitigation. Inevitably, investments that produce
large amounts of greenhouse gases will face compliance costs.
Already, the German government faces a claim under the Energy
Charter Treaty by the corporation Vatenfall over Kyoto Protocol
related regulations concerning coal-based electricity production.249
The point is not that host State governments should be given a
blank check to enact environmental and health regulation
regardless of its consequences for foreign investors. Instead, I
argue the current investment disciplines are sufficient to the task,
and having been previously developed in the context of customary
international law, offer more certainty in investment dispute
resolution.
5.3. The Chilling Effect on Environmental Regulation
States should be permitted to incorporate advances in science
and technology to protect local populations or join in worldwide
efforts to combat transnational environmental problems by
introducing new environmental regulation. They should be
encouraged to discharge their obligations under international
environmental agreements.
However, investment treaties
attaching penalties to environmental regulations make
environmental protection legislation and enforcement a risky
game, particularly for less developed States. If investment treaty
tribunals continue to follow the trends of the Metalclad, Tecmed and
Santa Elena tribunals, disregarding the non-discriminatory purpose
behind environmental regulations when assessing investment

Id. para. 442.
Kate Miles, International Investment Law and Climate Change: Issues in the
Transition to a Low Carbon World (Society of International Economic Law, Working
Paper No. 27/08, 2008).
249 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG v. Germany, ICSID Case No.
ARB/09/6 (2009).
247
248
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agreement violations, the chilling effect on environmental
regulations could be serious.
If the investment agreement contains a stabilization clause,
governments may become absolutely fettered in their ability to
regulate concession agreements.
Even when an investment
agreement does not contain a stabilization clause, host States may
prefer not to exercise preventative measures that delay the
implementation of a project, such as injunctions or suspension of
licenses, for fear of legal retaliation based on foregone profits.
Because multinationals often have resources for evasion far
exceeding the enforcement capacities of host States, environmental
protection in developing countries is already severely challenged.
As one author puts it, “Besides the continued application of low
standards for decades to come, this situation also shifts to the host
state the risk of currently unknown social and environmental
standards which may be discovered in future and which may be
prevented or minimized through regulation.”250
The norm of predictability and stability for foreign investment
in international law is important, but it should not take absolute
precedence over the principle that States are the representatives of
their people within their territories. Clearly a proper balance needs
to be struck in international investment law between preserving
legitimate expectations of investors and the needs of countries to
regulate for the welfare of their public. The problem is investment
treaties such as the Model BIT currently lack the necessary
precision for arbitrators to find the balance. We should distinguish
the situation when a State acts intentionally and deceptively to
manipulate the machinery of government to deprive an investor of
his property rights from those generally applied administrative
actions that arise from demands for accountability of government
and the true functioning of the democratic legislative process.
Without providing tribunals with manageable guidelines for their
implementation, the investment agreement provisions, too broadly
construed, would easily blur such distinctions.
5.4. A Narrow Interpretation of the Provisions for the Breach of an
Investment Agreement
The previous considerations call for an interpretation of the
investment agreement provisions that accord with the customary
250

Cotula, supra note 16, at 11.
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international law on the minimum standard treatment for aliens
and respect the right of governments to regulate for the protection
of the public welfare. The following matrix is a suggested
interpretation of the DRC that attempts to reconcile it with
international customary law on contracts between aliens and
States. In the case that a regulation or measure in violation of the
investment agreement is discriminatory, the law of State
responsibility is invoked by the breach of investment agreement
and international law is applicable to the investment agreement
claim. In this situation, a reasonable interpretation based on the
total context of the dispute resolution clause would require the
tribunal to award the value of the damage sustained to the
underlying investment that provides the standing for the
investment agreement claim, namely the reliance interest.251 But
where the challenged State action is a non-discriminatory
regulation of general application, whether recovery should be
awarded depends on whether the regulation falls within the scope
of a valid stabilization clause in the investment agreement.
Although a discussion of the validity of stabilization clauses
under international law is beyond the scope of this Article, some
relevant considerations in determining whether a stabilization
clause is valid could be: (1) the length of the period; (2) the degree
of restrictions on state autonomy in policy making (whether it
stabilizes the legislative framework or the economic equilibrium of
the agreement); and (3) whether the stabilization clause has been
otherwise legitimized by specific legislative decrees referring to the
commitment (validity under domestic law). Finally, even if the
investment agreement has a valid stabilization clause, when the
breach of the stabilization clause is due to non-discriminatory
exercise of police powers, the proper measure of damages would
depend on that specified on the face of the investment agreement
or in the host State’s contracting laws rather than that awarded
under the treaty’s award clause.
6.

CONCLUSION

This Article has discussed the origins and implications of the
procedural framework for the arbitration of investment

251 David Collins, An Economic Justification for Reliance Damages at ICSID
(2008), available at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000
&context=david_collins.
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agreements under the 2004 U.S. Model BIT from both legal and
policy perspectives. Under the U.S. Model BIT framework for the
arbitration of investment agreement claims, a range of government
administrative actions within the prerogative of States to regulate
for public health and welfare could become forms of compensable
liability for host States that are currently not considered to be
violations under customary international law.
Government
measures in the field of environmental enforcement and natural
resources management are particularly likely to become sources of
liability for host States. The investment agreement provisions of
dispute resolution clause, broadly interpreted, open alternative
avenues for investors to claim extensive damage awards against
the public sector for breaches of obligations in concession contracts
that are not contemplated in the public contracting laws of the
States. As such, they are likely to chill legislation in the field of
environmental protection and hinder the enforcement of existing
national, regional and international environmental laws.
Accordingly, in this Article I have argued for a narrow
construction of the investment agreement claims provisions to
reduce the tension with environmental enforcement, and to
reconcile the provisions with customary international law and
investment arbitration precedents.
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